Business Cycles, Indicators and Forecasting by James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Business Cycles, Indicators and Forecasting
Volume Author/Editor: James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-77488-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/stoc93-1
Conference Date: May 3-4, 1991
Publication Date: January 1993
Chapter Title: A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators:
Econometric Issues and Recent Experience
Chapter Author: James H. Stock, Mark W. Watson
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7190
Chapter pages in book: (p. 95 - 156)2  A Procedure for Predicting 
Recessions with Leading 
Indicators: Econometric Issues 
and Recent Experience 
James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Since  the  pioneering  work  on  leading  indicators  by  Mitchell  and  Bums 
([  19381 1961) and their collaborators at the NBER, the prediction of business- 
cycle turning points has been one of the core problems of business-cycle anal- 
ysis. This paper describes one approach to forecasting the future state of the 
business cycle or, more simply, to predicting recessions. The paper has three 
objectives. The first is to provide the mathematical details of this approach to 
forecasting recessions. The second is to evaluate the empirical performance of 
the resulting recession probability forecasts. This evaluation focuses on the 
sharp economic downturn in the fall of 1990, which provided an opportunity 
to examine the performance of a range of leading economic indicators under 
the unusual conditions of a broadly weak economy facing the prospect of oil 
supply disruptions and war in the Persian Gulf. The third objective is to draw 
some  general conclusions  about  the  use  of  leading indicators for  macro- 
economic forecasting. 
The methodology for estimating the probability that the economy will be in 
a recession at a future date is described in section 2.1. Rather than trying to 
forecast turning points (see, e.g., Kling  1987; Hymans 1973; Neftci  1982; 
Wecker  1979; and Zellner, Hong, and Gulati 1987), the scheme focuses on 
forecasting a 0/1 variable that  indicates whether the economy will be in a 
recession in a given month. The basic idea is to define recessions and expan- 
sions as different patterns of economic activity in such a way that whether the 
James H. Stock is professor of political economy at the Kennedy School of Government, Har- 
vard University. Mark W.  Watson is professor of economics at Northwestern University. Both are 
research associates of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The authors thank Rob Engle, Kenneth Wallis, and Jeff  Wooldridge for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft and Gustavo Gonzaga for research assistance. This work was supported in part by 
National Science Foundation grant SES-89-10601. 
95 96  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
economy will be in a recession in, say, six months is equivalent to whether the 
path of overall economic activity six months hence falls in a recessionary or 
an expansionary pattern. With quantitative definitions for these two patterns, 
the probability that the economy is in a recession during a future month can 
then be computed by the stochastic simulation of a model that forecasts future 
economic activity. 
The recession and growth forecasts examined here were produced by  the 
model developed in  Stock and  Watson  (1989). This model  was  estimated 
using data from January  1959 through  September 1988. Since then, it has 
been used to produce three indexes of overall economic activity on a monthly 
basis: an experimental coincident index (the XCI); an experimental leading 
index (the XLI), which is a forecast of the growth in the XCI over the subse- 
quent six months; and an experimental recession index (the XRI), which esti- 
mates  the  probability that the economy  will  be  in a recession  six months 
hence.  The in-sample performance of  the recession forecasts (the XRI)  is 
examined in section 2.2. This investigation provides little evidence of  mis- 
specification in the recession definition, in the algorithm used to compute the 
recession probabilities, or in the linear structure of the forecasting model used 
to construct the XCI and the XLI. 
The data since October 1988 provide true out-of-sample observations on 
the performance of the experimental indexes, including the recession index. 
Since May  1989, the XCI, XRI, and XLI have been publicly released on a 
monthly basis, with release dates approximately coinciding with the release 
of the Composite Index of Leading Indicators produced by the Department of 
Commerce (DOC). The performance of  the experimental indexes over this 
period is studied in section 2.3. In brief, forecasts of  growth rates through 
September 1990 performed apite well., with gowth rate forecast errors half 
what they were in sample. However, the experimental indexes failed to fore- 
cast the sharp decline that began in October 1990. 
Section 2.4 investigates a variety of possible sources for the poor perform- 
ance of  the indexes over the fall of  1990. The main conclusion is that the 
source of the large forecast errors and of the failure of the recession index to 
forecast the downturn is not the recession definition or the mathematical struc- 
ture of the model but rather the choice of  specific leading indicators used to 
construct the indexes. An analysis of a broad set of 45 coincident and leading 
indicators, including the seven in the experimental index, demonstrates that 
almost all performed quite poorly during this episode. Only a few,  such as 
housing building permits, consumer expectations, a measure of business sen- 
timent, oil prices, help wanted advertising, and stock prices, signaled that the 
economy would  suffer a  sharp contraction. It  is  of  course easy  to recog- 
nize that these particular indicators performed well ex post; the challenge is 
how they could have been identified ex ante. These and other conclusions are 
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2.1  Calculation of Recession Probabilities 
This section outlines the procedure used to calculate the probability that the 
economy will be in a recession at time T,  conditional on leading and coinci- 
dent economic indicators observed through time f.  Let R, be an indicator var- 
iable that equals one if  the economy is in a recession and zero otherwise. 
Throughout, x, denotes a vector of coincident variables, and y, denotes a vec- 
tor of leading indicators that are useful in predicting future economic activity. 
It is assumed that xs  is stationary in first-differences and that the leading indi- 
cators have been transformed so that y,  is stationary. 
The objective is to calculate the probability of being in a recession in month 
7,  given data on (x~,  y,)  through month t; this probability is denoted P+. The 
approach to computing P,,,  has three components: the specification of the con- 
ditional probability model for the state of  the economy; the definition of  the 
recession event R,  in terms of the state of the economy; and the estimation of 
the model parameters. These three components are addressed in turn  in the 
following subsections. 
2.1.1  The Model 
The probability model used to describe the evolution of (hl,  y,)  is a dy- 
namic single index model of the form proposed by  Sargent and Sims (1977) 
and used, for example, by Geweke (1977) and Singleton (1980). This is dis- 
cussed at length in Stock and Watson (1989, 1991) and is only sketched here. 
The comovements at all leads and lags among the coincident variables are 
modeled as arising from a single common source c,, a scalar unobserved time 
series that can be thought of as the overall state of the economy. The idiosyn- 
cratic components of the growth of each of the coincident variables (the part 
not arising from leads and lags of c,)  is assumed to be stationary and uncorre- 
lated with the idiosyncratic components of the other variables, but otherwise 
it can have a rich serial correlation structure. In particular, 
(1)  Ax, = p + y(L)Ac, + u,, 
where (E,,  q,)  are serially uncorrelated with a diagonal covariance matrix, and 
where D(L) = diag[d,,(L)]. To fix the timing of c,,  one of the elements of y(L), 
say, yi(L),  is set equal to y,o (in the empirical model, y,[L] = yio for three of 
the four coincident variables used). 
Leading indicators are added to the model to help predict future values of c, 
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where ui  = (u:,  u:,) is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and is independent 
The model (l), (2),  (4),  and (5) can be solved to obtain  linear minimum 
mean square error linear forecasts of future values of Ay, and x, or to estimate 
the unobserved state Ac, or c,. This is readily implemented using the Kalman 
filter, as described in Stock and Watson (1991). With the additional assump- 
tion, which is made throughout, that (E,,  u,) are jointly normal with constant 
conditional covariances, these linear projections are also conditional expecta- 
tions. 
of  E,. 
2.1.2 
A key aspect of this analysis is obtaining a quantifiable definition of a reces- 
sion. Bums and Mitchell (1946, 3) provide a somewhat vague but nonetheless 
useful  description  of a recession  as a substantial prolonged decline in eco- 
nomic  activity  that  occurs  broadly  across  various  sectors of  the  economy. 
More recent working definitions used by business-cycle analysts refine these 
ideas  and emphasize the “three  Ds”:  for a slowdown to be  a recession,  it 
should be sufficiently long (duration), it should involve a substantial decline 
in economic activity (depth), and it should involve multiple sectors or all the 
sectors of  the economy rather than simply reflecting an isolated decline in a 
single sector or region (diffusion). 
The generally  accepted  business-cycle  chronology  is maintained  by  the 
NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee.  In practice,  each individual  on 
the committee must trade off  these various parts of the definition to decide 
whether a particular episode warrants classification as a recession. The com- 
mittee eschews numerical rules; this would limit its flexibility in deeming a 
particular episode a recession when there are unforeseen extenuating circum- 
stances that are not amenable to being incorporated in a formulaic definition. 
The definition of a recession adopted here attempts to capture, in a simple 
way,  the institutional process in which recessions are categorized. We define 
a recession in terms of the growth of the unobserved state of the economy, Ac,; 
this embodies the requirement  that the recession be economywide,  not  spe- 
cific to only one or two individual series. We treat the problem of classifying 
a sequence {Acd, were it observed,  as a pattern  recognition problem:  if the 
sequence falls in a recessionary pattern, then it is classified as a recession; if 
it  falls in an expansionary  pattern,  it is an expansion.  The recessionary and 
expansionary patterns that are possible in a sequence (AC,-~+,,  . . . ,  Ac,) of 
length k constitute subsets of W; whether such a sequence is an expansion or 
a recession depends on which subset the sequence falls in. 
We suppose there to be two elementary recessionary patterns. In the first, 
D,,  Ac, falls below a threshold b,,  for six consecutive months; in the second, 
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D,,  Ac, falls below b,, for seven of nine consecutive months,  including the 
first and last months. That is, 
(6) 
(7) 
D,, = {Acs, s = T -  5, . . . ,  T:  Acs 5  br,s,  s  = T - 5, . . . ,  T}, 
D,,  = {Acs, s = T - 8, . . . ,  T:  AC,-~  5  br,T-8,  AcT 5 b,,, 
#(Ac,  5  b,,,, s  = T - 7,  . . . ,  T - 1) 2  5}, 
where  #(a)  denotes the number of times that the event occurs.  Given the 
thresholds {br,l},  the economy is in a recession in month t if and only if  that 
month falls in a recessionary pattern.  Since a recessionary  pattern D,, can 
commence anytime between t - 5 and t for the month to be in a recession, 
the set of recessionary patterns constituting a recession at date t is 
D, =  UD,, U  UD,,  E  ’$I7. 
(8)  i:::  1  c::  i 
Thus, the recession event R, is 
(9)  R,  = l[(Ac,-8,  . . . ,  Act, , . . ,  AC,+8) E D,], 




U,, = {Acs, s = T - 5, . . . ,  T:  Ac5 > b,,,,  s  = 7-5, . . . ,  T}, 
U,, = {Acs, s = 7-8,  . . . ,  T:  AcT -  >  Ac,  > b,,,, 
#(Ac,  > be,>,  s  = T -  7,  . . . ,  T - 1) 2 5}, 
r+5 
u, =  (UU,, u  uu,,  E ’$17,  [ T=f  1  1 
(12) 
(13)  E, = 1[(Ac,-8, . . . ,  Ac,, . . . ,  AC,+~)  E U,]. 
The complement of U, and D, in 8”  is nonempty; that is, these definitions 
leave room  for  indeterminant  sequences.  Because  the recessiodexpansion 
classification is dichotomous, these indeterminant events are ruled out in com- 
puting the probability of a recession. Thus, the probability that the economy 
is in a recession in month T,  conditional on coincident and leading indicators 
observed through month t and the cutoff values, is 
Pr[R,  = 1I(R, = l)U(ET  = 11, x,, x1-,, . . . ,  x,,  Y,, Y,-,.  . . . ,  Y,;  b,, be), 
where 6,  and b, are the collection of cutoff values. 
This probability  is conditional on the sequence of cutoffs (b,,, be.>.  One 
approach is to treat these as unknown time-invariant parameters, which could 
then be estimated. There are, however, at least two arguments for treating 
these parameters as random. First, this definition is in terms of c,, while the 
process of identifying actual recessions involves the examination of a broad 
set of indicators; one interpretation of this is that the cutoff used in the reces- 100  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
sion definition should itself depend on macroeconomic variables that are omit- 
ted  from this  analysis.  Second and  alternatively,  the process  by  which the 
Business  Cycle Dating Committee reaches  a decision  involves different  as- 
sessments of what constitutes a recession among the different members of the 
committee; one model  of  this  is that  each committee member has in mind 
some pair (br,,,  be,>  for month t but that these vary across committee members 
and indeed over time for each member. Both arguments suggest that (br,,,  bc.J 
can usefully be treated as random, and this approach is adopted here. Specifi- 
cally, br,,  and be,,  are modeled as 
(14)  br,, = IJ-,  + 5,,  be,,  = pe +  5,y  5, i.i.d. "0,  ug), 
where 5, is independent of (E,,  v,). 
mation through month t,  is thus 
The probability that the economy is in a recession in month T,  given infor- 
P,,, = J Pr[R,  =  ~I(R,  =  ~)u(E, =  I), x,, x,-,, . . . ,  x, 
(15) 
where 5, = ((,-8,  . . . ,  cT+J', and F&.) is the c.d.f. of 5,. 
The conditional  probability  P,,,  involves  integrating  over  a  thirty-four- 
dimensional  Gaussian distribution  (a seventeen-fold  integration to compute 
the conditional probability 
Pr[f?,  =  = ~)u(E, = 11,  x,, x,-~,  . . . ,  Y,, Y,-,, . . . ;  br(CT),  b,(5,>1 
and an additional seventeen-fold integration over tT).  In practice, the integra- 
tion is performed by Monte Carlo simulation using the following algorithm: 
i.  Compute the conditional mean mrlr  and covariance matrix a,,,  of F, ( -  8, 
8), where 5,( -k,,  k,)  = (Ac~-~,,  . . . ,  AcT, . . . ,  Ac,,,,),  given data 
through month t. (In steady state, aTI,  is a function of T -  t, not T or t 
separately.) 
ii.  Draw a pseudorandom realization  of  E,(  -  8, 8) from the N(mTlr,  a,,,) 
conditional distribution of ET. 
111.  Draw a realization of b,,  and be,,,  where bi,,  = (bi,T--8,  . . . ,  b,,T+8),  as 
iv.  For each realization of [E, ( -  8, 8), 6,,,  be,,],  evaluate R,  and E,  according 
to (9) and (13), respectively. 
v.  Repeat ii-iv  (in practice enough times to obtain a minimum of two thou- 
sand draws of E, or R,), and compute PTI,  as #(R,)/[#(R,) + #@,)]. 
It is worth emphasizing that this definition of a recession treats the identifi- 
cation of  recessions (more generally,  cycles)  as a pattern recognition  algo- 
rithm that could be applied to many series. This contrasts with approaches in 
Y,, Yr-17  . . .9 Y, ;  be(5,),  4(tT)Iq(5J 
= E[R,I(R,  = l)U(E,  =  11, x,, Xr-,? . . . 9  x, Y,, Y,-,,  ' . '  9  Yll7 
... 
(b,,,  be,,>  = (Pe + tT,  p,  + f,) according to (14). 101  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
which R, is related to the time-series properties of the process, in which R,  is 
useful in predicting future c, given its past. An example of the latter situation 
is Hamilton’s (1989) model in which a discrete variable, empirically identified 
as a recessiodexpansion indicator, enters the conditional mean of  the time 
series. One can usefully think of the latter situation as being one in which the 
definition of the recession event is intrinsic to the time-series model generat- 
ing the data; a recession is then not well defined if the process is in fact linear 
and Gaussian. In contrast, the pattern recognition approach developed here 
can be applied whether the series is linear, Gaussian, or stationary. 
2.1.3 
The estimation strategy is based on a partition of  the joint density of  the 
leading indicators, the coincident variables, and the recession indicator. Let Y, 
= (YI, . . .  7  Yr), X, =  . ’. .  xr)’S,  = (R,,  . . . ,  R,),  and C, = (cI,  . . . , 
c,). The joint density of (Y,,  X,, S,)  can be factored 
(16) 
This factorization is done without loss of  generality and serves to define the 
parameter vector p as the additional parameters introduced in the conditional 
density f,. In  terms of  the model in section 2.1.1 and the definition of  the 
recession variable R,, 8 is the vector of parameters given in (l),  (2), (4), and 
(5),  and p is the vector of parameters describing the distribution of the reces- 
sion threshold parameters, so p = (pe,  p,, a<)  as defined in (14). 
In general, as long as 6 appears infl, computing the maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE) will entail maximization of the joint density fly,,  X,, S,l6, 
p).  The  MLE  simplifies to  a  two-stage process  if  6  does not  appear  in 
f,,  which would occur were R, defined in  terms of  the observable variables 
(X,, Y,)  and the parameters p,  for example, if Ac, were replaced by  Ax,, in the 
definitions of D,,  and E, in section 2.1.2.  However, because c, is unobserved, 
6 entersf,, and the MLE does not have a convenient simplification. Intuitively, 
because c, is unobserved, R,  provides another dependent variable (in this case, 
discrete valued) that, in conjunction with the continuous variables, potentially 
provides useful information for estimation. 
Unfortunately, because R, is a discrete-valued time-series variable, the im- 
plementation of  the MLE for (16) is numerically imposing. The parameters 
are therefore estimated in a two-stage process, estimating 6 first, then p.  The 
estimation of 6 is described at length in Stock and Watson (1989, 1991) and is 
not discussed here. In the second stage, p  is estimated conditional on the first- 
stage estimate of  8. While this simplifies the estimation of  6, maximization 
of the conditional likelihood  f,(S,IY,,  X,;  p,  6) remains numerically demand- 
ing.  Estimation therefore proceeds  by  minimizing  the  mean  square  error 
Z;==,,(R,  -  P,,T)2  (where t, = t  + 36  so that the probabilities could be com- 
puted using the steady-state state covariance matrix a).  The resulting estima- 
Estimation of the Model Parameters 
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tors for pr, p,,,  and a<,  computed by  a grid search, are a, = -  1.5, $,  = 
-0.25,  and6 = 0.8.’ 
The estimated model and various in-sample specification tests are discussed 
in Stock and Watson (1989, 1991), to which the reader is referred for details. 
2.1.4  Treatment of Data Irregularities 
The form of the model in sections 2.1.1-2.1.3  used for monthly forecasting 
incorporates two modifications for data irregularities that arise when working 
with monthly data releases. Both involve conceptually straightforward (but 
computationally and notationally involved) modifications of the basic Kalman 
filter for the state space representation of the model (l),  (2), (4), and (5). The 
general strategy for handling data  irregularities is to  make an  appropriate 
modification of the state vector, the state transition equation, and the measure- 
ment equation. We now turn to the specifics. 
One coincident indicator (manufacturing and trade sales) is reported by the 
Department of Commerce with a lag of an additional month. Let a,  denote the 
state vector in the state space representation of  (I), (2), (3), and (4); let ‘Y,,, 
denote the expected value of the state vector given observations on all vari- 
ables except x,, through month f  and on x,, through month f - 1, and let arl, 
denote the expected value of  a,  given data on all variables through date f. 
Because complete data are available through t - 1, the Kalman filter can be 
applied to the unmodified model to form  At date t, the state space 
model is altered by  modifying the measurement equation (1)  to exclude the 
equation for the coincident variable in question. Alternatively, the equation 
could be included, an arbitrary finite observation used for the variable in ques- 
tion, and a measurement error term appended to (1) with infinite variance (in 
practice approximated by a large constant). 
The  second  important modification  of  the  standard  Kalman  filter  is  to 
handle revisions in many of the coincident and leading variables. Let z;, denote 
the value of  z,, published at date f  + j,  where z,,  indicates an element of the 
vector z, = (Ax,’, y:).  Thus, j = 0 corresponds to the initial release of z,,, j = 
1 corresponds to the first monthly revision, etc. The revision error is z,,  - 
z;, = e;,, and the model is modified to account for this additional error. The 
appropriate modification to the model depends on the covariance properties of 
q,. We  find it useful to consider two extreme assumptions concerning e;,, anal- 
ogous to the “news” and “noise” assumptions of Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) 
(see also Mankiw, Runkle, and Shapiro 1984). The first assumption-noise- 
corresponds to the classical errors-in-variable model 
1. The sensitivity to the choice of optimand was checked by recomputing the estimates using 
the pseudolikelihood obtained by treating R, as an independent Bernoulli random variable with 
probability Pdr.  The point estimates for p,,,  p,<, and u  were close for the two optimands, and, more 
important,  the estimated probabilities Pdr  were virtually indistinguishable. For  both optimands, 
the surface of the objective function was rather flat in a neighborhood of the optimized values. 
Evidence of this insensitivity is given in sec. 2.4.1 below. 103  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
zj, = z,, + e;,, 
where e;, is uncorrelated with z,,. Because this is a dynamic model, it is further 
assumed  that e;, is uncorrelated  with  all values  of  the  actual data, that  is, 
E(e;,zh) = 0 for allj, i, k, t,  and T,  and that measurement errors are uncorre- 
lated across series, that is, E(e;,e;)  = 0 for allj, n,  1, and T when kf  i. 
The second assumption-news-corresponds  to the  optimal  forecasting 
model 
zit = z;, + e;,, 
where e;, is uncorrelated with z;,. Thus, z;, is viewed as an unbiased forecast of 
z,,,  and e;,  contains information (news) about zt, not contained in z;~ 
The modifications needed to incorporate a single “noise” variable in univar- 
iate models are discussed in Harvey et al. (1981). The modification to handle 
multiple noise variables in this application is a straightforward generalization 
of this single variable modification. The modifications necessary to incorpo- 
rate a “news” variable into the model are simpler: if the preliminary variable 
is an optimal forecast of  the final variable,  and if  (as is assumed) the data 
collection agency uses a superset of the information in (X,,  Y,)  to produce this 
optimal forecast of the final series, then optimal estimates and forecasts of a, 
can be constructed by substituting the preliminary data in place of  the actual 
data and running the Kalman filter on the unmodified model. However, while 
no modification is necessary to produce atl,,  it is necessary to modify its cov- 
ariance matrix to reflect the increased uncertainty associated with the prelim- 
inary data. The details of the Kalman filter modifications for measurement 
error are provided in Stock and Watson (1988).* 
2.1.5 
Since its estimation  in early  1989, this model  has been used to produce 
three indexes on a monthly basis: an experimental coincident index (XCI), an 
experimental  leading  index  (XLI),  and  an  experimental  recession  index 
(XRI). The XCI is the estimate of the state at time r, that is, XCI = c,~,.  The 
XLI is the estimate of its growth over the subsequent six months, c,+~~,  - c,~, 
(because x, is in logarithms, c,+~  -  c,  is the six-month growth in c,; the XLI 
is reported at annual percentage growth rates, i.e., 200[~,+,~,  -  cc]). And the 
XRI is the probability  that the economy will be in a recession in six months 
(XRI = P,+,lt).  The coincident and leading  variables  used  in  the model, 
which were selected by a modified stepwise regression procedure (see Stock 
and Watson  1989), are listed in panels A and B, respectively,  of table 2.1. 
Since mid-1990, we have also been tracking a second set of indexes (the XL12 
and the XRI2), based solely on nonfinancial indicators. The coincident indi- 
Summary of the Estimated Indexes and Their Interpretation 
2.  The empirical implementation allows for a maximum of j  = 12 revisions. The covariance 
matrices of e, = (ef,, . . . ,  q;)’  were estimated using data from 1981:l through 1985:12. 104  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.1 
Mnemonic  Transformation  Description 



















A. Coincident Indicators 




Personal income, total less transfer payments,  1982$ 
Manufacturing and trade sales, total, 1982$ 
Employee-hours in nonagricultural establishments 
B . Leading Indicators in the XLI 
Levels  Housing authorizations-new  private housing 
Growth rates 
Growth rates 
Manufacturers’ unfilled orders: durable goods industries, 
1982$, smoothed 
Trade-weighted nominal exchange rate between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, 
Italy, and Japan, smoothed 
Part-time work in nonagricultural industries because of slack 
work (U.S. Department of Labor, The Employment Situa- 
tion, Household Survey), smoothed 
Yield on constant-maturity portfolio of  10-year U.S.  Trea- 
sury bonds, smoothed 
Spread between interest rate on a 6-month commercial paper 
and the interest rate on 6-month U.S. Treasury bills (Fed- 
eral Reserve Board) 
Spread between the yield on constant-maturity portfolio of 
10-year U.S. T-bonds and the yield on 1-year U.S. T- 





C. Leading Indicators in the XLI2 
Levels  Housing authorizations-new  private housing 
Growth rates 
Growth rates 
Manufacturers’ unfilled orders: durable goods industries, 
1982$, smoothed 
Trade-weighted nominal exchange rate between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, 
Italy, and Japan, smoothed 
Average weekly hours of  production workers in manufactur- 
ing 
Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, total (Federal Re- 
serve Board) 
Index of help wanted advertising in newspapers (The Con- 
ference Board) 






Note:  The series described as “smoothed” were passed through the filter (1 + 2L + 2L2 + L’). 
All variables except exchange rates and interest rates are seasonally adjusted. 105  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
cators entering the XL12 are those in panel A, and the leading indicators en- 
tering the XL12 are given in panel C of table 2.1. 
Empirically,  the XCI can be thought of  as a monthly proxy for real GNP. 
Simple regression  relations  between  the  XCI  produced  by  the  estimated 
model, aggregated to a quarterly  level, and real GNP are presented in table 
2.2. The correlation between the six-month growth of the XCI and real GNP 
is large, approximately  .88. Although the mean growth of the XCI and real 
GNP are approximately equal over this period, XCI growth is more volatile, 
and the regression coefficient of GNP growth onto XCI growth is .58.  This 
implies that XCI growth of zero corresponds approximately to GNP growth of 
1.3 percent. 
2.2  In-Sample Analysis of Probabilities 
This  section  examines the  within-sample  performance  of  the  estimated 
recession probabilities.  The analysis focuses on three types of potential mis- 
specification:  misspecification of the probability  model, so that the informa- 
tion in the included leading and coincident indicators is not fully incorporated 
into the predicted  probabilities; omission  of  alternative  indicators that help 
predict recessions; and misspecification  associated with the possible duration 
dependence in recessions and expansions, that is, with the possibility that the 
length of the current recession  (expansion) might usefully  predict when the 
next expansion (recession) will occur. 
The probabilities examined here are based on the model outlined in section 
2.1, estimated  in early  1989 using data from 1959:l to 1988:9. The seven 
leading indicators used in the XLI were selected from a “short list” of fifty- 
five series. Any such selection of a few variables from many exacerbates the 
usual  risks of overfitting,  so the in-sample analysis in this section provides 
only limited guidance in assessing the performance of the model. Still, rejec- 
tion by these in-sample diagnostics would suggest specification problems in 
the way the probabilities are calculated. 
Table 2.2  Relation between the XCI and Real GNP OLS Regressions of the 
Form In(RGNP,/RGNP,_& = a  + p In(XCIQ,/XCIf-,) + e, (1%2: I- 
1988:II1, where XCI F is the XCI, aggregated to a quarterly level) 
k (quarters)  &  B  R2  SEE 
1  1.286  .577  .65  2.31 
2  1.296  ,578  .78  1.50 
(.264)  (.042) 
(.173)  (.030) 
Note:  Autocorrelation-robust  standard errors (computed using 6 lagged autocovariances with a 
Bartlett kernel) are reported in parentheses. Estimation used quarterly observations. The quarterly 
XCIQ  series was constructed by  averaging the values of  the XCI over the months in the quarter. Probability 
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Fig. 2.1  Estimated recession probabilities, 1962:l-1988:9 
Note: The dates on the horizontal axes denote c,  the date through which the data are available 
for computing P,,,,,.  The figure is based on data revised through 1988:9. 107  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
The recession probabilities Pr+k,r,  as estimated through 1988:9, are plotted 
in figure 2.1 for various horizons.  (The dating convention plots Pr+kl,  at time 
t.)  At a horizon of one month, the probabilities are sharp; the forecasts be- 
come substantially less precise as the horizon increases beyond six months. 
The performance  of  these  predictions  is  investigated  in  tables  2.3-2.5. 
Panel A of table 2.3 presents, for each horizon, the average predicted proba- 
bility, P,  the proportion of recession realizations R,  the R2  of the predictions, 
and the RMSE (root mean square error) of the prediction. The table suggests 
a slight bias in the predictions: P >  R for all horizons. (Because the probabil- 
ities are nonlinear functions of k,,  pe,  and u,  minimizing the mean square 
Table 2.3  Predictive Performance of Recession Probabilities  P,+& Summary 
Statistics 
A. Overall 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Statistica  I  3  6  9  12 
P  ,180  .I86  ,187  ,185  ,183 
R  .I46  .147  ,148  ,150  ,151 
R2  ,789  ,687  ,577  ,482  ,367 
RMSE  .176  ,215  ,251  ,279  ,309 
B. Statistics by Cell 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Cell  Statistic'  1  3  6  9  12 
.o 5  P  .015  .022  ,042  ,061  ,086 
P  R  ,004  .Ooo  ,016  ,024  .040 
< .25  N  26 1  250  25 1  249  248 
.25 5  P  ,368  ,362  ,349  ,349  ,343 
NR  1  0  4  6  10 
P  R  ,067  ,211  .308  ,387  ,525 
< .50  N  15  19  26  31  40 
Nil  1  4  8  12  21 
.50 5  P  ,627  ,613  ,639  ,630  .613 
P  R  ,364  ,577  ,571  ,643  .519 
< .75  N  11  26  21  28  27 
NR  4  15  12  18  14 
.75 5  P  ,918  ,896  ,895  ,889  ,845 
P  R  ,896  ,789  .781  ,684  ,444 
< 1.0  N  48  38  32  19  9 
NR  43  30  25  13  4 
'For  definitions, see the text. 108  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.4  In-Sample Regression Tests for Omitted Variables in P,+,,  @-values of 
test statistics) Based on OLS Regressions, 1962:l-1988:9 -  k 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Variable  0  I  3  6  9 
Constant  ,064  ,058  ,141  ,327  ,475 
~~ 
Coincident Indicators 
IP  ,740  ,549  ,961  .545 
GMYXP8  ,914  .317  ,624  ,950 
MT82  ,614  ,655  ,558  ,746 
LPMHUADJ  ,482  ,249  .396  ,594 






































































Leading Indicators in the XR12 
.258  ,275  ,475  ,847  ,625 
.613  ,478  ,555  .458  ,305 
,839  .567  ,558  ,755  ,965 
















































,977  ,942  ,896  ,596  .530 
.932  ,454  ,282  ,758  ,533 
.983  ,750  ,938  ,558  ,751 109  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
Table 2.4  (continued) 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Variable  0  I  3  6  9 




,685  ,262  .417  .661  ,424 
.814  ,628  .42  I  ,689  ,827 
,498  ,493  .249  ,707  ,905 








,363  ,334  ,659  ,225  ,921 
,285  .243  ,225  ,498  ,462 
,173  ,079  .086  .880  ,388 
,353  ,231  .I99  ,661  ,668 
,640  ,218  ,139  .81 I  .295 
,490  ,506  ,559  .556  ,438 
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Note:  The p-values refer to Wald tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients on (z,, . . , ,  z,_J in 
the regression of  R,,, -  P ,  + ,),  on a constant and z,,,  . . . ,  z,_~  are zero, where k refers to the 
forecast horizon (months). The tests were computed using autocorrelation- and heteroskedastic- 
ity-robust covariance matrices, constructed as weighted averages of k  + 5 autocovariances with 
Bartlett kernel  weights.  A p-value  of  ,000 denotes a p-value < ,0005. The regressions were 
estimated from 1962:l-1988:9 -  k. The variables are defined in the appendix. 110  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.5  In-Sample Regression Tests for Omitted Variables in P,,,,, @-values of 
test statistics) Based on WLS Regressions, 1962:l-1988:9 -  k 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 






























,001  ,000  ,001  ,123  ,035 
Coincident Indicators 
,670  ,760  ,841  ,658  ,503 
,587  .853  ,559  ,882  .639 
,932  .73  I  ,682  .571  ,899 
.98  I  ,762  ,466  ,955  .492 









































Leading Indicators in the XRI2 
.735  ,409  ,461  ,596  ,510 
.486  .564  ,372  ,150  ,131 
,398  ,369  .677  ,875  ,954 
















































.969  ,934  ,842  ,950  ,841 
,827  ,851  ,438  ,826  ,973 
,663  ,806  .527  ,801  ,540 111  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
Table 2.5  (continued) 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Variable  0  I  3  6  9 
Consumption and Retail Sales 
IPCD  ,831  ,710  ,639  ,853  ,538 
CMCDX2  .993  ,797  ,860  .740  .979 
RTR82  ,974  ,648  ,517  ,697  .879 
Inventories and Orders 
M PCON X  ,758  .849  ,899  .480  ,894 
MOCMX2  ,507  .I93  ,499  ,768  ,859 
M  DO82  ,375  .528  ,759  .772  ,654 
IV.UTX2  ,400  ,491  ,594  ,787  ,624 
IVM I DX  ,903  ,545  ,737  ,608  ,670 
IVM2DX  .893  ,861  ,396  ,897  ,552 


























,855  ,678 
,736  ,390 
,660  ,427 
,721  ,956 
,634  ,906 
.980  ,701 
,942  .772 


























































Note: Computed by weighted least squares regression as discussed in the text, with weights w, = 
min {P,+&,,(l  -  P,+&,,),  .01}. See the note to table 2.4. 
error [MSE] need not result in unbiased  forecasts: reducing the sample bias 
would increase the sample MSE.) 
Panel B of table 2.3 takes a closer look at the predictions by partitioning 
the observations into cells based on the predicted value. In the table, N repre- 
sents the number of observations in the cell, N, represents the number of these 
observations that turned out to be periods of  recession.  For example, of  the 112  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
251 times within sample that P,,61,  fell within (0,  0.25), only four of  those 
turned out to be recessionary  months; if a value of P,++  below  .25 is inter- 
preted as a signal of “no recession,” this corresponds to a false negative rate 
(the probability of a recession given a forecast of no recession) of 1.6  percent. 
Similarly, if P,+61,  2 0.75 is interpreted as a recession signal, then this signal 
had a within-sample  false positive rate of 22 percent (7/32). This interpreta- 
tion of false negative and positive rates corresponds to monthly forecasts of 
whether the economy will be in a recession, which is different than whether 
the economy will shift from an expansion to a recession, or vice versa, in the 
next six months. The latter concept is of practical interest, but, given the few 
turning points in the sample, it is one for which a false positiveinegative rate 
cannot be computed as reliably. 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the primary within-sample evidence concerning 
possible  misspecification  in the  probability  model.  From  (15), P,+kl,  is the 
conditional expectation of R,,  given data through t. One way to test whether 
the estimated probabilities  satisfy this condition is to ask whether the errors 
R,,,  -  Prfkl,  can be predicted as linear functions of the observable indicators. 
This is done using regressions of the form 
where z, denotes an indicator observable at time t,  transformed to be stationary 
so that conventional asymptotic theory can be used to interpret the regression 
results. Under the null hypothesis that the model (l), (2), (4), and (5) and the 
algorithm in section 2.1.2 are correctly specified, a  and p(L)  will equal zero. 
Because R, is a probability,  el in (19) will be heteroskedastic,  having a condi- 
tional  variance  under the  null  of Pt+kl,(l  -  PrfkIr).  In  addition, the k-step- 
ahead forecast error will be serially correlated. Were R, observable at t,  under 
the null hypothesis el would be MA(k - 1); however, because turning points 
are declared only with a delay (typically of six to eighteen months), the order 
of the dependence of e, is presumably greater. 
Results of specification tests based on (19) are presented in tables 2.4 and 
2.5.3 In table 2.4, the p-values are computed by estimating (19) by OLS and 
computing heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust  standard errors. Be- 
cause the errors are conditionally heteroskedastic, table 2.5 reports p-values 
based on weighted  least squares (WLS) regressions, where the weights  are 
based  on  the  conditional variance  under  the  null,  P,+k,,(l - Pr+kl,),  and 
p-values were computed using an autocorrelation-robust  covariance matrix.4 
3.  The dates of  the cyclical peaks and troughs used to construct R,  for the subsequent empirical 
analysis are the official dates of the NBER  Business Cycle Dating Committee, with one exception: 
the committee dated the  1969 cyclical peak as 1969:12, while throughout we use 1969:lO. Ac- 
cording to the recession definition in sec. 2.1.2, the earlier date is more consistent with the rules 
used to define the other historical turning points, and 1969:lO was the date used to estimate the 
model and to produce the results in Stock and Watson (1989). 
4. The p-values ignore complications associated with the correlation between sampling error 
in the estimated parameters of  the model and the regressors in (19). 113  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
The tests in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are computed using the data as revised through 
October 1988, with the exception of the series labeled “additional indicators,” 
for which the data as revised through 1991:2 are used. (See the appendix for 
definitions of and sources for the series.) 
The first blocks of tables 2.4 and 2.5 examine the first type of  misspecifi- 
cation, in which the coincident and leading variables in the model might have 
predictive content for P,,,,,.  Because these included variables have no predic- 
tive content for the errors from the linear part of the model (l), (2), (4), and 
(5) (Stock and Watson  1989), rejections here would suggest misspecification 
in the definition of a recession. The XLI is also included in this panel. Aside 
from the regression on a constant,  which reflects the bias discussed in the 
context of table 2.3, neither the OLS nor the WLS results indicate rejections 
at the 5 percent level at any horizons. 
The next several blocks examine whether alternative leading and coincident 
indicators, not included in the model, have predictive content for R,,,  given 
Pf++.  The variables LPHRM through 1~~3~8  were included in the original short 
list of  fifty-five variables from which the seven included indicators were se- 
lected. Because the selection was done in the context of linear predictions of 
c,,,,  evidence of predictive content here would be evidence that the candidate 
variable has  marginal value in  predicting recessions and  expansions, even 
though it does not  in predicting overall economic growth rates. The results 
provide no strong evidence that the in-sample performance of  the recession 
probabilities could have been improved by incorporating these indicators into 
the XRI model. If anything, the p-values tend to be rather high, reflecting the 
use of these indicators in the preliminary analysis. 
The “additional indicators” in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are series arguably related 
to the  1990 downturn but not on the original short list of  fifty-five leading 
indicators. These indicators will be examined in  more detail in section 2.4 
below;  the relevant  point here  is  that,  on  the basis  of  the  1962:l-1988:9 
sample, taken individually none provide a significant improvement in the per- 
formance of the recession probabilities. 
The final block of results in tables 2.4 and 2.5 examines the marginal pre- 
dictive content of the DOC Composite Index of  Leading Indicators (DLEAD) 
and of  various nonlinear cyclical measures. Like the variables that compose 
it, the DOC leading index makes an insignificant contribution. There is some 
evidence that  a variable constructed using the “three consecutive declines” 
rule of thumb, in which a recession is signaled when the DOC leading index 
declines for three consecutive months, has some marginal predictive content 
for long horizons and that such a rule of thumb, applied to IP alone, has mar- 
ginal predictive value for short horizons. 
The final three variables examine the possibility that the business cycle ex- 
hibits duration dependence. Cyclical duration dependence has been examined 
by  Neftci  (1982) and others, most recently including Diebold, Rudebusch, 
and Sichel (chap. 6 in this volume). The linear model, combined with the 114  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
pattern recognition approach to identifying recessions used here, assumes that 
there is no duration dependence in expansions and recessions beyond that im- 
plied  by the minimum six-month lengths of  the events D,T  and  U,T. This as- 
sumption can be checked by examining whether variables related to the dura- 
tion of the current expansionlrecession have additional predictive content. An 
obvious candidate variable  is  the  duration  M, of  the  current  expansion  or 
recession.  Although  this  is not  known at time  t  with certainty  because  the 
dating committee identifies turning points only ex post, it can be estimated 
using the model of  section 2.1. Let w,,  be the expectation of M,  in month t, 
conditional  on  being  in  a  recession,  that  is,  MI  = E(M,IR, = 
1, x,, x,-  I, . . . ,  y,, y,-  I,  . . .); similarly define Mi, for expansions; and let 
MI,,  = wll  P,I,  + Mi,  (1 -  Pll,)  be  the expected  length of  the current  spell 
whether or not it is a recession. The time series MI,  Mi,, and Mil, were esti- 
mated using the model of section 2.1  .5 
The results for these duration dependence variables provide some evidence 
of this form of nonlinearity.  Both the OLS and the WLS results suggest that 
wl,  (MTREC in tables 2.4 and 2.5) is a useful predictor for short forecast hori- 
zons; the WLS results indicate that w,,  (MTEXP)  is a useful predictor for the 
six-month horizon as well. Thus, there appears to be some potential misspe- 
cification  associated  with the duration  of recessions.  There are several pos- 
sible sources of this misspecification; for example, the linear model (l), (2), 
(4), and (5) might incorrectly  ignore nonlinear feedback, perhaps from R,, or 
the linear model might be correctly specified but the recession definition itself 
(i.e., the process by which recessionary patterns are identified in time series) 
5. q,,  was constructed  as follows.  Using the algorithm in  sec. 2.1.2, generate a historical 
realization of  E,( -m - 8, X),  and, using adjacent septendecimtuples fT  (-8,  8), classify each 
month for T = t -  m, . . . ,  t as being in a recession or an expansion. This results in a vector of 
pseudorandom realizations of (R,-,,  . . . ,  R,),  constructed using data through f. In the computa- 
tions, m =  12, and historical (true) values of R,  were appended for T < t - 12. Let q,  be the 
length of the final string of Is through time f (f  = 1962:1, . . . , 1988:9)  if R,  = 1, and let  be 
the length of the final string of  0s if R, = 0. Then 4,  is the average of 4,  over the R,  = 1 Monte 
Car10 draws and similarly for M;,. This construction provides an approximation to the joint con- 
ditional distribution of (R,+,,  . . . ,  R,)  or to the distribution of functions of these random variables 
such as M,.  This approximation, however, has two difficulties. First, because br,,  and be,,  are treated 
as random and varying over f, the event UT  computed using b,,r differs from U,  computed using 
b,,,,,  (say). Second, even if b,,, and be,,  were constant (5,  =  c),  the marginal distribution of R, 
constructed using this procedure will differ from that based on the algorithm in sec. 2.1.2: the 
marginals in sec. 2.1 are implicitly 
Pr[R@,UE,] = Pr{RJR,UE,,  R,UE,U[9tH”/(R,UET)],  T #  t} 
(where X”/[R7UE,]  is the complement ofR7UE,  in ?RH”),  while those computed here are 
Pr[RJR,UE,] = Pr[R,(R,UE,,  RTUE,, T # t] 
It should be emphasized that this difficulty arises only when computing joint probabilities,  not 
when computing sequences of marginal probabilities (e.g.. P,++,  k  = 0, 1, 2, . . .). Resolving 
this issue awaits further research. 115  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
have a temporal dependence that is not captured by  the pattern recognition 
algorithm of  section 2.1.2. Ascertaining which if either of  these possibilities 
produces these rejections must await future research. 
Taken together, these results suggest that there is little in-sample evidence 
of  misspecification associated with the inefficient use of  information in the 
included indicators or in  candidate alternative leading indicators. Although 
there is some evidence of  nonlinear misspecification related to duration de- 
pendence, the evidence is strongest at short forecasting horizons, and, in any 
event, this misspecification is not well proxied by any of the alternative lead- 
ing indicators. 
2.3  Out-of-Sample Performance 
The XLI model was estimated using data through 1988:9. This section ex- 
amines the performance of the XLI and the XRI over the period from 1988:  10 
through 1991:10, the month for which the most recent data were available to 
us. This provides thirty-seven months, including a cyclical peak in July 1990, 
with which to assess the performance of the indexes and to draw conclusions 
concerning the modification of the indexes. 
2.3.1  Out-of-Sample Performance: An  Overview 
Forecasts of  the growth in the XCI (annualized growth rates) made using 
the XLI model since 1988:l are plotted in figure 2.2 for forecasting horizons 
of three, six, and nine months. The six-month-ahead forecast (panel B) is the 
XLI (i.e., crfh,,  - c,~,).  The estimated recession probabilities P,+,l,  for k  = 
-  2,0, 1,2,  3, 6, are presented in figure 2.3 and table 2.6. 
As figure 2.2 makes plain, it is useful to consider the performance of the 
XLI over two episodes: prior to the summer of  1990 (approximately 19905) 
and subsequently. In the first episode, the performance of the XLI was very 
good, forecasting both the slowdown in the spring of  1989 and the growth that 
followed. During the fall of  1988 and the winter of  1989, interest rates rose 
substantially, by  many reports in conjunction with an attempt by the Federal 
Reserve Board to control inflation; for example, the six-month Treasury-bill 
rate rose from 7.5 percent in October 1988 to 8.85 percent in March 1989. 
With the easing of  interest rates in the spring of  1989, the financial market 
indicators in the XLI became more optimistic: by July, the commercial paper- 
Treasury-bill spread had fallen to 58 basis points, just above its postwar aver- 
age and well below its March peak of  113 basis points. With this decline in 
interest rates and spreads, the XLI forecast increased growth: on the basis of 
unrevised data (i.e., as the XLI was originally computed), the XLI for March 
was -  1.1 percent, while, by July, the XLI had risen to 0.7 percent. The be- 
havior of the XLI forecasts was broadly consistent with the overall outlook at 
the time as reported in the economic and financial press, which was one of 116  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
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Fig. 2.2  Out-of-sample performance of the XLI  model 
Nore: The series c,+),, -  c,,,  is based on preliminary data, and c,+~,,+~  -  c,,, is based on revised 
data. 
general concern over economic conditions in the early spring being replaced 
by cautious optimism in the late spring and early summer.6 
As can be seen from figure 2.2,  over this episode the XLI model provided 
very good forecasts of overall activity, not only at the six-month horizon for 
6. For example, commenting on the 31 May  1989 release of  the Department of  Commerce's 
Leading Index in the New York Times (1 June 1989, Cl), Michael P.  Niemira of  the Mitsubishi 
Bank stated, "The message is more strength still in the pipeline." The article later states, "Weak- 
ness in various measures of output and sales have signaled that economic growth is slowing and 
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Fig. 2.3  Estimated recession probabilities 
Note: The dates on the horizontal axes denote t, the date through which the data are available 
for computing P,,,,. The figure is based on data revised through 1988:9 and unrevised data 
since 1988:lO. The series P,-,,, begins in 1990:7, and all other series begin in 1988:l. 118  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.6  Estimated Recession Probabilities P,,,,,,  by Month 
1988:lO 
1988:  I1 
1988:12 
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Nore: Recession probabilities were computed using unrevised (original) data 
which it had been optimized, but also at the three- and nine-month horizons. 
During this episode, the XRI indicated an increased probability of a recession: 
the XRI peaked at 32 percent in March 1989 and then quickly declined. 
that the Federal Reserve might ease the tight grip it has kept on monetary policy for more than a 
year.” In the Wall Srreer Journal that same day (p. A2), Gary Ciminero of FleeVNorstar Financial 
Group was quoted as saying, “I think it [the DOC Leading Index] means that if we do encounter a 119  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
The second episode starts in the summer of  1990. On the basis of  data 
through March 1990, the XLI was 3.1 percent, down from almost 5 percent 
in January and February 1990. In comparison, the XCI growth over the six 
months from March to September was  1.6 percent (annual rate), a forecast 
error of  1.5 percent, similar to previous out-of-sample performance and only 
approximately 1 percentage point in GNP units. The three-month-ahead fore- 
cast based on data through June 1990, for June-September, was -  0.8 percent 
(annual rates); actual growth in the XCI over this period was  -0.4  percent. 
However, the slowdown-correctly  predicted over the next three months- 
was predicted to be short, to be followed by positive but slow growth. As a 
consequence,  the  recession probability-computed  for each future month 
using data through June 1990-remained  low, only 5 percent for each month 
from August through February 1991. This forecast of moderate growth in the 
fall of  1991 was, as it turned out, dramatically wrong: the XLI computed in 
August was 3.6 percent, while the actual growth of the XCI over this period 
was  -7.3  percent, a forecast error of  10.9 percent (over 6 percent in GNP 
units at an annual rate). At the time of this writing (December 1991), the XLI 
appears to be back on track: the XCI increased by 3.9 percent at an annual rate 
between April and October 1991 (the most recent month for which data are 
available), and in April the XLI predicted that this growth would be 2.9 per- 
cent. 
The performance within sample and during these two out-of-sample epi- 
sodes is summarized in table 2.7 in terms of  the RMSE and mean absolute 
errors (MAEs) of the forecasts.’ The table shows that, during the first episode 
(1988:  10-1990:4),  the out-of-sample performance of the XLI was noticeably 
better than expected on the basis of  the in-sample experience, with RMSEs 
and  MAEs  half  what  they  were  in  sample.  During  the  second  episode 
(19905-1991:4;  1991:4 is the final month for which  has been ob- 
served),  forecast errors  were  approximately two  times as large as  within 
sample. 
As can be seen from figure 2.3, the XRI has continued to estimate a six- 
month-ahead recession probability of  under 20 percent; the XRI missed the 
July 1990 peak. It should be emphasized, however, that shorter-run forecasts 
indicated an increased probability of a recession, although not until October 
or November. For example, Prl,,  computed using data through October, was 
28 percent; computed using data through November, it was 80 percent. Even 
so, the probability of a recession declined sharply with the horizon; in Novem- 
ber, the three-month-ahead recession probability was only 23 percent. 
An  initial possibility is that the XLI continued to be a good forecast of 
~~ 
more significant slowdown in the economy, it’s not going to occur in the next few months. I think 
we’ll encounter a recession at the start of next year.” 
7. Note that k-month-ahead forecasts made during  1988:lO -  k, . . . , 1988:9, k  2  1, are 
partly out of sample, even though they are not included in the span used to  compute the out-of- 
sample summary statistics in table 2.7. 120  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.7  Performance of the XLI:  Summary Statistics 
Sample Period  RMSE  MAE 
A. Forecasting Per- 
formance of the XLI 
1962:  1-1988~9  2.89  2.32 
198O:l-1988:9  3.50  2.94 
1988: 10-1990:8  3.72  2.32 
1988:  10-1990:4  1.35  1.13 
1990:5-199 1.4  6.26  4.96 
1980: 1-1990:8  3.54  2.83 
B. Relation between 
XCI Growth and GNP 
1962:1-1988:111  2.34  1.84 
1988  :IV-l99O:IV  1.32  1.07 
Nore: Panel A: The root mean square error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) are computed 
for the difference between the XLI  (c,+~~,  -  c,~,)  and the 6-month growth in the XCI (c,+~~,+~  - 
c,,,).  The dates in  the first column correspond to the date that the forecast was made, so 1991:4 
corresponds to the last observation for which there are data on c,+~~,+~.  Panel B: The statistics are 
computed for the residual  from  a regression (estimated over  1962:1-1988:111) of  the quarterly 
growth of real GNP at annual rates on the quarterly growth of the XCI, where the XCI growth is 
the quarter-to-quarter growth of the monthly XCI, averaged across the months in the quarter. 
economic activity but that the relation between overall economic activity (say, 
real GNP) and the XCI had  deteriorated since 1988:9. This possibility  is, 
however, readily dismissed: the out-of-sample relation between the XCI and 
real GNP was, if  anything, closer than it had been in sample. This is docu- 
mented in the final rows of table 2.7. Although there are currently only two 
observations on the quarterly XCI and real GNP during the second episode, 
the relation between the two appears to have been stable: the residuals from 
the 1962:1-1988:111  regression of quarterly GNP growth onto quarterly XCI 
growth in table 2.2 yields forecast errors of -  1.2 percent and 0.9 percent for 
1990:III and 1990:IV, respectively, less than either the in-sample RMSE or the 
in-sample MAE. 
The remainder of this paper explores possible explanations for the failure 
of  the XLI and the XRI to predict the 1990 recession, with the objective of 
drawing lessons from this experience to guide revisions of  the index and, 
more generally, future research on leading indicators. This section first docu- 
ments the contributions of the individual variables to the XLI over 1990, then 
examines the importance of data revisions during the second episode. Section 
2.4 turns to more fundamental issues of  specification, construction of the in- 
dex, and the choice of leading indicators. 121  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
2.3.2 
The XLI model as described in section 2.2  is linear in the data and in cr; as 
a result, c,+~~~  can be written as a linear projection onto current and past values 
of the observable series 
Contributions of Individual Indicators to the Overall Index 
where z, = (Axr’, yr’) denotes the vector of four coincident and seven leading 
indicators in the XLI, where A,,@)  are lag polynomial weights, and where A 
is a trend growth rate. These weights A,,(L) are readily computed numerically 
and are plotted in Stock and Watson  (1989). The weighted averages Akt(L)z,, 
constitute the contribution of each of the eleven indicators to the deviation of 
the k-step-ahead forecast from its mean Ak.  An examination of  these contri- 
butions for k  = 6 therefore shows how each of the variables influenced the 
performance of the XLI on a month-by-month basis. 
These historical contributions to the index are plotted in figure 2.4 over 
1988:l-1991:lO  and  are  presented  in  table  2.8 for  January  1990 hence. 
Through the summer of 1990, the coincident indicators made negligible con- 
tributions to the index, usually 0.3 percent or less. The largest contributions 
to the index typically were made by  building permits,  exchange rates, the 
public-private yield spread, and the Treasury-bond yield spread. 
This pattern changed during the second half of  1990. Although the public- 
private spread variable made positive contributions during July and August, 
its contribution in September and October was approximately zero. This was 
consistent with the doubling of this spread over this period, from thirty-nine 
basis points in July to seventy-nine basis points in November. The largest 
negative contributions came from housing authorizations and part-time work 
due to slack work. Three variables typically made substantial, incorrectly pos- 
itive contributions to the index: the Treasury-bill yield curve, exchange rates, 
and, since December 1990, industrial production. The positive contribution 
of  industrial production during this period reflects a mean reverting compo- 
nent in the model after the sharply negative values of  IP in October and No- 
vember. The yield curve and exchange rate contributions suggest that these 
variables might be partly to blame for the poor performance of  the index. 
However, even if the contributions of these two variables are eliminated, then 
the XLI in September would still have been  1.7, while in fact the XCI de- 
clined by over 7 percent over this period. 
In the winter and early spring of  1991, housing permits, unfilled orders, 
and part-time employment continued to provide negative signals. The appre- 
ciation of  the dollar during the first quarter led exchange rates to provide a 
negative contribution to the XLI.  The yield curve continued to steepen as 
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even more positive contribution from the yield curve spread. Finally, the com- 
mercial paper-Treasury-bill  spread fell below its historical average, providing 
a positive contribution to the XLI. By the middle of  1991, all the indicators 
except exchange rates and unfilled orders were providing positive signals and 
suggesting stronger-than-average  short-term growth in the XCI. Table 2.8  Historical Contributions  to the XLI, January 1990-February  1991 
Month  IP  GMYXPS  MTSZ  LPMHU  HSBP  MDUSZS  EXNWTZFS  LHNAPSS  FYGTIOFS  CP6-GM6F  G1O-GIF  XLI  C,+6,,+6 -  c4, 
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To understand the behavior of the XLI during the second half of  1990, it is 
useful to contrast the behavior of  the financial variables around the cyclical 
peak of July 1990 to their behavior just before the cyclical peaks in November 
1973, January 1980, and July 1981. In each of these three periods, the yield 
curve was strongly inverted: the spread between ten- and one-year Treasury- 
bond yields (GIO-GI)  was, respectively,  -0.61,  -  1.59, and -  1.39 in the 
month before each of these cyclical peaks, while its July 1990 value was 0.38. 
Similarly, the commercial paper-Treasury-bill  yield  spread  (CP~LGM~)  was 
1.60, 0.96, and 1.13 in the month before these peaks but only 0.43 in June 
1990 (approximately its postwar average value). Thus, the strong negative 
signals given by these variables prior to the previous recessions were replaced 
by  neutral or slightly positive signals during the summer of  1990. Although 
the corporate paper-Treasury-bill  spread had increased to 0.79 by November 
1990, this increase occurred only after the general slowdown in  September 
and October had become apparent. 
In summary, this analysis of the historical contributions during the onset of 
the 1990 recession suggests two observations. First, the financial variables- 
in particular, the yield curve spread and, to a lesser extent, exchange rates- 
gave optimistic signals throughout this episode, even in the late fall, when the 
general public perception was that  a recession was inevitable. Second, al- 
though none of the other variables gave strong positive signals, only three- 
part-time work, building permits, and unfilled orders-gave  negative signals, 
and these negative contributions were still moderate, particularly in the sec- 
ond and third quarters of  1990. 
Whether there were other variables that would have predicted this recession 
had they been incorporated into the index is the topic of the next section of the 
paper. First, however, we turn briefly to a discussion of data revisions during 
this episode. 
2.3.3 
Some of the revisions to the data on the coincident indicators during the fall 
of  1990 were large. Table 2.9 presents these data as they were released over 
this period, in terms of  monthly growth at annual percentage rates. On the 
basis of  recent revisions, we see that industrial production growth was posi- 
tive through September; estimates of the decline in IP in October ranged from 
almost 11 percent (annual rate) in the 1990:  11 data release to only 7.6 percent 
in the 1991:l release. An examination of table 2.9 reveals comparable revi- 
sions in the other coincident indicators. Even though measurement error mod- 
els are explicitly incorporated into the XLI model as described in section 2.1, 
large revisions in the coincident indicators can nonetheless result in substan- 
tial changes in cZtkl,  for k small (say, k 5  3). This raises the possibility that the 
poor performance of the XLI and the XRI was, at least in part, due to their 
reliance on these substantially revised preliminary data. 
This possibility is examined in figure 2.5, which presents the XLI com- 
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Table 2.9  Coincident Indicator Data and Revisions, 19905-19912: Monthly Growth 
at Annual Rates 
Data Released During the Month Following: 
Data for:  1990:9  1990: 10  1990:ll  1990:12  1991:l  1991:2 
A. Industrial Production 
19905  6.60 
1990:6  7.65 
1990:7  2.18 
I9903  1.09 
I990:9  3.26 
1990:lO  - 
1990:l I  ... 
1990:12  ... 
1991:l  ... 
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-23.38 
-  14.94 
... 
D.Total Employee-Hours in Nonagricultural Establishments 
1990:5  9.84  9.84  9.84  10.01  10.01  10.01 
I990:6  5.65  5.65  5.65  9.23  9.23  9.23 
1990:7  -3.32  -  3.32  -  3.32  -3.56  -  3.56  -  3.56 
1990s  -4.06  -4.71  -4.71  -4.74  -4.74  -  4.74 
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Table 2.9  (continued) 
Data Released During the Month Following: 
Data for:  1990:9  1990:lO  1990: 1  I  1990:  12  1991:l  1991:2 
1990:lO  ...  -  15.24  -  16.93  -  17.39  -  17.39  -  17.39 
1990:  1 1  ...  ...  3.85  4.13  4.13  4.13 
1990:  12  ...  ...  ...  6.01  6.00  4.36 
1991:l  ...  ...  ...  ...  -  18.88  -  15.77 
1991:2  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  3.71 
Source: Department of Commerce Electronic Bulletin Board, various releases. 
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Note: The XLI and the growth in the SCI are at annual rates 
puted using the unrevised and the revised data as well as the actual growth of 
the XCI based on the most recently available revised data. Although the revi- 
sions in the coincident indicator data are large, these revisions had scant effect 
on the XLI: the change in the XLI based on the revised data is typically less 
than 0.4 percentage points. One explanation for this is that the XLI relies in 
large part on leading variables not subject to revision, in particular, the finan- 
cial variables; another is that the predictive role of the coincident indicators, 
although substantial for very short horizons, diminishes markedly for longer 
horizons. In any event, the large revisions to the coincident indicators over 
the summer and fall of  1990 do not seem to be the source of  the breakdown in 
the XLI and XRI forecasts. 
2.4  Alternative Specifications: Recent Performance 
This section investigates the failure of the XLI to predict the downturn in 
the fall of  1990. The analysis centers around two main possibilities. The first 
is that, given the list of indicators selected, the model was incorrectly speci- 128  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.10  Sensitivity of P,+6,,  to p,, pe,  and u~:  RMSE for R,,, -  P,,,,,, in 
Sample (1962:l-1988:9) and out of Sample (1988:lO-1990:s) 
.OOO  -.250  -.500  .OOO  -.250  -.500  k,b< 
A. u1  = .6 
-1.250  ,250  ,248  .250 
,486  ,483  ,484 
-  1.500  .249  ,250  ,250 
,486  ,486  .476 
-  1.750  ,250  .25  I  .25 1 
,485  ,486  ,484 
c.  U( =  1.0 
-  1.250  ,250  ,247  .250 
,485  .484  ,482 
-  1.500  ,249  ,250  ,250 
,486  .486  ,486 
-  1.750  ,249  ,251  ,253 
,483  , .486  ,485 
B.  uc  = .8  D. Additional RMSEs 
-  1.250  .250  .249  ,250 
,486  ,483  .482 
-1.500  ,249  .250  ,249 
,485  .486  .485 
-1.750  .250  .250  ,250 
,484  ,487  .485 
P,  = 0,  p, = 0, 
P, = 0,  p<  = 0, 
,258 
,258 
U( = 1.0:  ,489 
uc  = .8:  ,447 
Note: The upper entry in each (p,,  p?,  00 cell is the in-sample RMSE; the lower entry is the out- 
of-sample MSE. For these calculations,  the most recent turning point was the cyclical peak of 
I990:7. 
fied or “overfit,” in the sense that it was too heavily parameterized. The second 
is that the list of indicators was flawed: had other indicators been included, 
would the XRI have predicted a recession? 
These two questions are addressed in several steps. We  first consider the 
effect of possible modifications of the definition of a recession on both the in- 
sample and the  out-of-sample  performance  of  the  XRI.  Because the main 
source of  the failure in the XRI stems from the overly optimistic forecasts 
embodied in the XLI in August and September, it is not surprising that tuning 
the recession definition does not substantially improve the performance of the 
XRI. Next, we consider the possibility that the model is overparameterized, 
resulting in “overfitting” the in-sample data. This is examined by studying an 
alternative set of indexes, based on the seven leading indicators in the XLI, in 
which the number of estimated parameters is reduced and the structure of the 
index is simplified substantially. The performance of these indexes is compa- 
rable to the XLI, both in and out of sample, which leads us to conclude that 
overparameterization or model misspecification does not account for the poor 
performance of the XLI. The analysis therefore turns to the performance of 
the individual indicators constituting the index and of alternative leading in- 
dicators and indexes. 
2.4.1  Changes in the Definitions of RecessiodExpansion Events 
The first possibility investigated is that the XRI would have performed bet- 
ter had it used a different definition of recessions. This is investigated, first, 129  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
by considering the effect of changing the parameters (p,,  k,,  at)  that enter the 
definition of recession and expansion events and, second, by redefining reces- 
sion events so that a recession can last only four months rather than six. 
The results of these changes are summarized in table 2.10 and 2.11. Table 
2.10 presents the RMSEs of the XRI forecast errors (i.e., Rr+6 -  Pr+6,,),  both 
in and out of sample. The much larger RMSEs out of  sample than in sample 
largely reflect the failure of the XLI to predict the downturn in the fall of 1990. 
In general, the RMSE, both in and out of sample, is insensitive to changes of 
? .25 for p,  and pe  and of  k .2 for ac;  minor modifications in the recession 
definition would not have resulted in more accurate recession probabilities. 
Six-month-ahead recession probabilities for 1990, computed using alterna- 
tive  parameter  values,  are  summarized  in  table  2.11.  Although  modest 
changes make negligible differences, increasing the recession cutoffs to p,  = 
Table 2.11  The Effect of Changing the Definition of a Recession on the XRI 
Probabilities (P,,,,,)  for January-December  1990 
(p,. P<?  a,) = 
(-1.5.  (-1.75,  (-1.5,  (-1.5,  (.O,  4-Month 
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Nore: Panel A: The entries are the values of the XRI (P,+6,,)  that would have been computed for 
each month during  1990, had  the indicated values of (p,, p,, cr5) been used. To  facilitate com- 
parisons, the first column reports the value of the XRI; the next four columns report probabilities 
computed with  alternative parameter values. The final  column reports probabilities computed 
using the parameters used in the model, but with the minimum length of a recession taken to be 
4 rather than 6 months. Panel B: The entries are the RMSEs of R,,, -  P,+k,,  over the indicated 
(in-sample and out-of-sample) ranges. 130  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
ke = 0 would have produced slightly higher probabilities; the XRI would 
have registered 13 percent in September rather than 3 percent. However, cut- 
offs this high are implausible: the pre-1988:10 RMSEs for these parameters 
exceed those for the chosen parameter values, and, more important, because 
the XCI is more volatile than GNP, recession cutoffs of p,  = p,  = 0 approx- 
imately correspond to a recession occurring if real GNP growth drops below 
1.3 percent for two consecutive quarters. In the past, the Business Cycle Dat- 
ing Committee has dated recessions as if  the appropriate cutoff is approxi- 
mately zero growth in real GNP. 
The final modification considered here is reducing the length of the shortest 
recession from six to four months, with the result that (6) is replaced by 
(6‘) D,,  = {Acs, s = T -  3, . . . ,  T:  Acs 5  b,,s,  s = T -  3, . . . ,  T}, 
and similarly for U,,.  As seen in the final column of table 5.1  1, this change 
has little effect on the XLI,  in terms of  either the in-sample RMSE or the 
probabilities over 1990. 
In short, modifications of the recession definition-even  major ones, such 
as permitting recessions with a duration as short as four months or as shallow 
as growth dipping below  1.3 percent in the units of  annual GNP growth- 
have little effect on the recession probabilities computed over this episode. 
2.4.2  Possible Overparameterization and Overfitting 
Because the linear model outlined in section 2.1.1 has a large number of 
parameters, it is possible that the poor performance during the fall of  1990 
can be attributed to “overfitting” in the sense of having too few observations 
per parameter. This possibility is investigated by  constructing some simple 
alternative indexes that entail fitting considerably fewer parameters. These 
indexes are of the form 
where 9,  are the indexes (forecasts) constructed from each of the n individual 
leading indicators entering the index. The individual forecasts are computed 
as the projection of  the growth of  the XCI over the next  six months onto 
current and lagged values of each candidate leading indicatory, and onto cur- 
rent and lagged values of XCI growth; that is, 9, is the fitted value from the 
regression 
An index constructed according to (21) and (22),  like the XLI, is linear in the 
leading indicators and has a representation analogous to (20).  * 
8. For related work that approaches the construction of indexes of leading indicators as a fore- 
casting problem, see Auerbach (1982), Stekler and Schepsman (1973), and Vaccara and Zamo- 
witz (1978). 131  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
The parameters o,  p,(L), and y,(L)  in (22) were estimated by  running the 
regression in (22) with contemporaneous values and five lags of y,, and with 
contemporaneous values and two lags of AC,~,.  If, in fact, Acrl,  and y,, follow a 
VAR(p), this regression would be inefficient relative to estimating a VAR(p), 
but this procedure has two advantages: first, it produces conditionally un- 
biased projections (conditional on lags of y,J if  the true projection is linear 
(with the specified lag length); second, it reduces the number of parameters 
that need to be estimated for multistep forecasting. 
Because the individual “indexes” j,,  are each forecasts of  cr+61T  - cIlr,  the 
problem of constructing a composite index-that  is, computing the weights 
{a,)  in (21) given the set of individual indexes to be included-reduces  to the 
well-studied problem of the combination of forecasts. Two simple approaches 
are used here. The first is analogous to the weighting scheme effectively used 
to construct the DOC Leading Index; that is, all the weights are set to lh9 
The second approach is to produce the minimal mean squared error linear 
combination of forecasts, which is implemented by estimating a,  by OLS with 
c,+~~~  -  crlZ  as the dependent variable and j,,  as the independent variable. The 
net effect of constructing indexes using this simple structure is to reduce sub- 
stantially the number of parameters to be estimated, relative to the model of 
section 2.1.1. 
Composite indexes based on (21) and (22) were estimated using data over 
the period  1959:l-1988:9.  The RMSEs of  the resulting indexes are summa- 
rized in table 2.12, along with the corresponding RMSEs for the XLI. (These 
and subsequent RMSEs for indexes of the form [21] and [22] are computed 
relative to the growth in the smoothed XCI,  c,+~,~  -  crlT.) Relative to the 
OLS-weighted index with the same seven leading indicators, the XLI per- 
forms better both in and out of sample, but it performs slightly worse than the 
equally weighted index out of  sample. Overall, the performance is compa- 
rable across these three indexes for all subsamples. 
The same exercise was repeated for the leading indicators composing the 
XL12 (the alternative nonfinancial leading index). As with the indexes based 
on the XLI indicators, the performance is similar across indexes in  all sub- 
samples. The implication is that the fitting of many parameters in the XLI (or 
XLI2) model does not appear to be a key factor in the breakdown in the fall of 
1990. 
A second conclusion emerging from table 2.12 is that, although the XL12 
does markedly worse than the XLI in sample, it noticeably outperforms the 
XLI out of  sample, with a reduction of  almost one-quarter in the RMSE for 
forecasts into the fall of  1990. This, along with the findings of the previous 
section concerning the insensitivity of  the XLI to the recession definition, 
suggests that the problems with the XLI resulted from omitting leading indi- 
9. For discussions of the DOC weighting schemes, see Zamowitz and Boschan (1975a, 1975b) 
and Zamowitz and Moore (1982). Table 2.12  Forecasting Performance of Alternative Composite Indexes: Six-Month-Ahead Forecast Horizon 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 








4.38  3.55  I .75  7.61 
2.76  3.42  I .39  7.62 
3.57  3.36  1.31  7.54 
2.78  3.70  1.54  8.36 
3.xo  2.61  I .57  5.24 
3.94  3.20  1 38  7.07 
3.38  3.03  I .72  6.23 
3.12  2.45  1.34  7.53 
2.20  2.15  I .08  1.24 
2.61  2. Ih  I .oh  7.39 
2.25  2.36  1.14  8.  I4 
2.83  1 .Y3  1.35  4.61 
2.83  2.10  I  .08  6.93 
2.64  2.15  I .40  5.73 
Nore:  “Constant”  indicates  forecasting  c,+~  - c, by  a constant only.  The alternative composite indexes XLI-equal,  XLI-OLS, 
XLIZ-equal, and XLI2-OLS  are constructed  according to eqs. (21) and (22) in the text. In the “equdly weighted” indexes, the 
weights in (21) are a,  =  l/n, while, in the “OLS-weighted’ indexes. {a3  are estimated by ordinary least squares. XLI indicators: 
LHEL. IVPAC. All indexes were computed using the revised data as of  1991:2.  RMSEs were computed relative to (c,,,,, - c ,d. 
AII  growth rates are in percentages, at annual rates. 
HSBP.  MDU82S. EXNWTZFS. LHNAPSS. FYGTIOFS, CP6-GM6F.  GIO-GLF;  xL12 indicators: HSBP, MDU82S. EXNWTZFS.  LPHRM, IPXMCA. 133  A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators 
cators that turned out to have important predictive content for the 1990 down- 
turn and including others that did not. 
2.4.3  Alternative Indicators: Diagnostic Tests 
The tests based on the regressions (19) provide a useful framework for 
checking whether alternative leading or coincident indicators would have been 
useful in predicting R, over  1988:lO-1991:2.  The p-values for the resulting 
Wald tests are reported in table 2.13. Because of the limited number of out- 
of-sample observations, only current values and two lags of each candidate 
indicator are used in the regressions. Also, in this out-of-sample period, there 
are only three nonoverlapping nine-month periods, so the most distant horizon 
considered is six months. Because there are fewer than five nonoverlapping 
observations on Pr+bJ,,  the six-month horizon results need to be interpreted 
cautiously as well. 
The results provide strong evidence of misspecification during this period. 
The weights given to the included indicators-in  particular, housing starts, 
exchange rates, and the ten-year bond rate-were  ex post incorrect. This ac- 
cords with the message of figure 2.4 above: exchange rates and the interest 
rate indicators yielded overoptimistic predictions during the summer and fall 
of  1990, and the XLI (and the XRI) would have performed better had building 
permits been given more weight. 
Table 2.13 also demonstrates that alternative indicators would have been 
useful in predicting the XRI forecast errors, in particular, help wanted adver- 
tising, stock prices, money and credit supply measures, and, at longer hori- 
zons, oil prices and some measures of investment, orders, consumption, and 
consumer expectations. These results demonstrate that, over this episode, the 
XRI forecast errors could have been reduced by using additional indicators 
and by  placing different weights on those that were included. Because the 
forecast errors in the XRI were large, however, partially explaining these er- 
rors does not in the end seem to be a very demanding task. More challenging 
is seeing whether the alternative indicators might have provided satisfactory 
forecasts of this and earlier recessions, either alone or as part of an alternative 
index. 
2.4.4  Alternative Indicators: Performance of Single-Indicator Indexes 
This subsection presents some initial results analyzing the performance of 
alternative indicators and indexes since 1988:lO. The indexes are of the form 
(21) and (22). They exploit the cross-covariance among the candidate leading 
indicators in only a limited way,  and they do not readily produce a recession 
index such as the XRI. However, for the purposes of  this section, indexes 
based on (21) and (22) have two practical advantages over those based on the 
framework in section 2.1: they are faster to compute, permitting an examina- 
tion of a much richer initial list of  indicators, and, when used in their equally 
weighted form, the contribution to the composite index of each of the candi- 
date indicators is transparent. 134  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.13  Out-of-Sample  Regression Tests for Omitted Variables in P,,,,,  @- 
values of test statistics):  OLS Regressions, 1988:lO-1991:2 -  k 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Variable  0  1  3  6 






.098  ,318  ,294  .7 18 
,214  ,100  ,135  ,369 
,223  ,910  ,917  ,269 
.346  .703  ,390  ,219 













































Leading Indicators in the XRI2 
,111  ,615  ,872  ,103 
,289  ,442  .954  ,352 
,435  ,507  ,005  ,000 
,033  .389  ,057  ,575 
Financial Indicators 
FSPCOMF 






,174  ,006  .0oO  .Ooo 
,008  ,088  ,012  ,000 
.235  ,535  ,327  .033 
,183  ,381  .627  ,131 
,179  ,142  ,353  ,002 
.I84  ,313  .219  .Ooo 





.462  ,217  ,979  ,550 
,620  ,798  ,093  ,950 




Consumption and Retail Sales 
,056  ,143 
,672  ,693 
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Table 2.13  (continued) 
Forecast Horizon (Months) 
Variable  0  1  3  6 









,579  ,366  ,633  ,528 
,641  ,667  ,764  .012 
,577  ,227  ,691  ,421 
,403  ,186  .I33  ,027 
,495  ,018  ,114  ,845 
,315  .I74  ,495  .om 















































Note: Thep-values refer to  Wald tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients on (z,,  z,-,, z,-J  in 
the  regression of R,,, - P,,,,,  on a constant and z,,  z ,_,,  z,-*, are  zero,  where k  refers to the 
forecast horizon (months). See the notes to table 2.4. All results were computed using the most 
recently available data through 1991:2. 
Table 2.14  presents RMSEs  and  MAEs for the “univariate indexes” Pit, 
which  are  the  forecasts  produced  by  the  regression  (22)  estimated  over 
1962:l-1988:9.  The results over 1988:lO-1991:2  provide out-of-sample evi- 
dence on each candidate indicator when considered one at a time. The most 
striking feature of table 2.14 is that, even though the XLI had an MAE of 7.2 
percent over the period  1990:5-1990:8,  with few exceptions this large fore- 
cast error is typical of  those for the univariate forecasts. For example, al- 
though the stock market declined in August 1990 in anticipation of the eco- 
nomic downturn, this one correct signal was insufficient to provide the XLI 
with improved forecasting power: its MAE over the final episode was 7.2 
percent. Forecasts based on inventories and orders all had larger MAEs than 
the XLI, and forecasts based on retail sales had MAEs of well over 6 percent. 
Certain financial variables-a  yield  curve dummy  that  performed  well  in 
sample and two indicators in the XLI (the public-private spread and the slope 
of the yield curve)-performed  particularly poorly, relative to the other vari- 
ables. Only five of the indicators in table 2.14-housing  starts, help wanted 
advertising, real M2, the quarterly ratio of the volume of commercial paper to 136  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.14  Performance of Single-Indicator  Indexes: Six-Month-  Ahead Forecast 
Horizon 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
62:l-  88:lO-  88:lO-  90:5-  62~1-  88:lO-  88:lO-  90:5- 





























2.76  3.42  1.39  7.62  2.20  2.15  1.08  7.24 
3.80  2.61  1.57  5.24  2.83  1.93  1.35  4.67 
Coincident Indicators 
4.31  3.36  1.79  7.04  3.11  2.36  1.39  6.97 
4.27  3.46  1.87  7.24  3.11  2.55  1.57  7.17 
4.27  3.45  1.47  7.63  3.08  2.27  1.17  7.51 
4.33  3.47  1.82  7.31  3.11  2.48  1.49  7.18 
Leading Indicators in the XLI 
3.81  2.40  1.23  5.09  2.87  1.62  .97  4.71 
4.25  3.32  1.83  6.89  3.01  2.42  1.48  6.86 
4.17  4.15  1.71  9.23  3.08  2.71  1.41  8.89 
4.22  3.48  1.93  7.21  3.01  2.59  1.64  7.11 
4.06  3.58  2.07  7.31  2.97  2.67  1.73  7.18 
2.97  4.20  1.79  9.30  2.33  2.72  1.35  9.21 
3.68  3.49  1.15  7.99  2.81  2.06  .86  7.79 
Leading Indicators in the XLI2 
4.33  3.36  1.59  7.28  3.12  2.26  1.22  7.20 
4.31  3.39  1.71  7.23  3.11  2.34  1.33  7.12 
3.95  2.59  1.60  5.14  2.83  1.78  1.12  4.90 
4.09  4.16  2.10  8.87  3.02  2.93  1.69  8.81 
Financial Indicators 
3.92  3.99 
3.96  3.10 
3.54  2.46 
4.33  3.50 
4.33  3.74 
3.60  3.18 
4.14  3.60 


















































4.20  3.57  1.64  7.78  3.01  2.42  1.30  7.71 
4.27  3.78  1.95  8.00  3.04  2.71  1.61  7.95 
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Table 2.14  (continued) 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
6211-  88x10-  88~10-  90x5-  62:l-  88~10-  88:lO-  90:5- 




















Consumption and Retail Sales 
4.29  3.79  1.73  8.28  3.08  2.55  1.38  8.11 
4.29  3.25  1.61  6.97  3.06  2.22  1.24  6.88 
1.17  6.58  4.26  3.09  1.44  6.72  3.04  2.11 
Inventories and Orders 
~ 
4.34  3.56  1.81  7.58  3.09  2.50  1.46 
4.29  4.00  2.08  8.44  3.05  2.80  1.63 
4.30  3.76  2.16  7.68  3.05  2.68  1.67 
4.32  3.99  1.94  8.60  3.08  2.70  1.49 
4.22  4.28  2.46  8.73  3.10  3.18  2.02 
4.32  3.80  1.82  8.20  3.13  2.58  1.42 




























1.35  6.05  3.08  1.95  1.11  5.98 
1.60  7.54  3.08  2.30  1.21  1.49 
1.70  6.24  2.94  2.29  1.48  6.17 
2.21  5.95  2.87  2.52  1.86  5.67 
2.63  7.14  2.90  3.17  2.36  6.98 
2.19  8.51  3.12  2.93  1.82  8.24 
2.19  8.37  3.13  2.84  1.75  8.01 
1.23  7.84  3.05  2.13  .95  7.72 
1.38  8.06  3.05  2.27  1.07  7.94 
Note; All results were computed using the data as revised through 1991:2. See the notes to table 2.12. 
bank loans, and the Michigan consumer expectations index-had  MAEs less 
than 6 percent. 
Table 2.15 presents results for univariate forecasts of three-month growth, 
that  is, indexes constructed with  c~+~~~  - crlT  as the dependent variable in 
(22). The results are broadly similar to those in table 2.15. Each of the univar- 
iate indexes substantially misforecast three-month growth during the final epi- 
sode, typically with forecast errors in the range of 5-7  percent (corresponding 
to one-quarter-ahead forecast errors of 3-4  percent in the units of annual GNP 
growth). The four indicators with the smallest MAEs at the six-month horizon 
have MAEs under 4 percent at the three-month horizon, as do the new orders 
index (PMNO)  and consumer expectations. 
In summary, these results suggest that, taken individually, only a handful of 
indicators would have been useful in predicting the 1990 downturn. During 
this contraction, consumer expectations, building permits, business expecta- 138  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
Table 2.15  Performance of Single-Variable Indexes: Three-Month-Ahead Forecast 
Horizon 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
62:l-  88:lO-  88:lO-  905-  62:l-  88:lO-  88:lO-  905- 































4.53  3.06  1.96  4.93  3.28  2.29  1.41  4.67 
4.57  3.39  1.93  5.70  3.30  2.43  1.34  5.38 
4.56  3.21  1.50  5.68  3.27  2.21  1.08  5.30 
4.55  3.37  1.84  5.74  3.29  2.40  1.33  5.30 
Leading Indicators in the XLI 
4.15  2.53  1.56  4.13  3.07  1.87  1.19 
4.48  3.25  2.01  5.31  3.20  2.28  1.32 
4.42  4.44  2.10  7.83  3.23  3.18  1.74 
4.35  3.29  2.03  5.38  3.14  2.57  I .66 
4.36  3.40  2.18  5.47  3.17  2.52  1.63 
3.66  4.35  1.51  8.00  2.80  2.98  I .24 








Leading Indicators in the XL12 
4.54  3.12  1.88  5.16  3.27  2.23  1.26  4.85 
4.55  3.08  1.86  5.08  3.28  2.23  1.29  4.77 
4.05  2.68  2.52  3.07  2.89  2.24  2.03  2.82 
4.40  3.71  1.73  6.57  3.23  2.51  1.12  6.30 
Financial Indicators 
~~ 
4.30  3.31  2.61  4.72  3.22  2.67  2.03 
4.28  3.10  1.92  5.06  3.09  2.32  1.48 
4.08  2.53  2.02  3.57  2.97  2.06  1.67 
4.51  3.62  1.68  6.40  3.19  2.42  I .22 
4.57  3.43  2.10  5.64  3.26  2.67  I .67 
4.09  3.17  1.39  5.67  2.94  2.15  .98 
4.25  3.19  2.13  5.05  3.04  2.47  1.69 










~~  ~  ~~~~~ 
4.46  3.18  1.83  5.34  3.21  2.28  1.29  4.99 
4.55  3.57  2.11  5.95  3.25  2.63  1.52  5.65 
4.29  2.95  1.84  4.81  3.10  2.22  1.40  4.44 
Consumption and Retail Sales 
~~ 
4.57  3.41  1.94  5.74  3.29  2.44  1.34  5.43 
4.53  3.26  1.96  5.38  3.26  2.32  1.30  5.06 
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Table 2.15  (continued) 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
6211-  88~10-  88110-  90:5-  62:l-  88x10-  88110-  90:5- 
Series  88:9  90:8  90:4  90:8  88:9  90:8  90:4  90:8 
Inventories and Orders 
MPCONX  4.53  3.55  2.05  5.94  3.22  2.60  I .54 
MOCM82  4.53  3.58  2.02  6.04  3.23  2.63  I .49 
MDOXZ  4.50  3.64  2.33  5.87  3.17  2.59  1.62 
IVMTXZ  4.55  3.81  2.37  6.21  3.25  2.78  I .70 
lVMlD8  4.54  3.83  2.17  6.46  3.32  2.82  I .57 
IVM2DX  4.57  3.53  1.93  6.02  3.34  2.56  1.40 










DLBLNPAP  4.51  2.80  1.71  4.60 
PM I  4.42  3.04  1.84  5.01 
PMNO  4.28  2.68  1.97  4.02 
HHSNTN  4.27  2.32  2.01  3.00 
HHST  4.34  2.75  2.21  3.86 
PW561  4.56  3.94  2.04  6.82 
PW561R  4.58  4.10  2.08  7.13 
FTM333  4.58  2.88  1.61  4.89 
mM333R  4.57  3.04  1.67  5.18 
3.26  2.17  1.33 
3.22  2.30  I .40 
3.08  2.13  1.56 
3.10  1.90  1.72 
3.12  2.21  1.74 
3.29  2.77  1.60 
3.31  2.84  1.60 
3.29  2.05  1.15 










Note: All results were computed using the data as revised through 1991:2. See the notes to table 2.12 
tions, help wanted advertising, and oil prices moved in advance of  overall 
economic activity. With the exception of stock prices, indicators of financial 
market conditions-the  slope of the Treasury yield curve, the public-private 
spreads, exchange rates, and interest rates-exhibited  different patterns than 
they did during the recessions in the 1970s and 1980s. One interpretation of 
these observations is that, at least since 1969, recessions have been associated 
with contractionary monetary policy; this was captured by  the interest rate 
indicators, accounting for their strong in-sample performance. The downturn 
of  1990, however, occurred in the face of monetary policy that, if not expan- 
sionary, was far less contractionary than it had been during the recessions of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Instead, the contraction was associated with sharp 
drops in consumer expectations, business expectations, and uncertainty over 
a possible war in the Gulf. 
2.4.5  Construction of Alternative Indexes 
The results of the previous section suggest that the key problem in model 
specification and forecasting over this period was the ability to select those 
few leading indicators that forecast the 1990 downturn. This indicator selec- 140  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
tion problem is studied empirically here by  constructing composite indexes 
that forecast six-month growth in the XCI  from two shortened lists of  the 
series in tables 2.14 and 2.15. The first list consists of  the eleven leading 
indicators in the XLI and the XLI2, augmented by stock prices, the new or- 
ders index, consumer expectations, and oil prices. These four variables were 
intentionally chosen because of their good performance in the second episode. 
The second list eliminates from the first exchange rates and all interest rate 
indicators (EXNWTZFS,  G10-GlF,  FYGTlOFS,  CPCLGM~F),  which are replaced by 
measures of  sales, orders, new unemployment insurance claims, and manu- 
For each list,  all possible indexes of  the form (21) and (22) were con- 
structed, subject only to the restriction that the indexes included no more than 
seven leading indicators. The weights {ai}  for each index were estimated by 
OLS. For each list, this produced 16,383 indexes, which were then ranked by 
their Schwarz information criterion (evaluated over  1962:  1-1988:9),  where 
the number of parameters equaled the number of  univariate indexes included 
in the composite trial indicator. All parameters were estimated over 1962:  1- 
1988:9 (with earlier observations for initial lags) using the most recently avail- 
able revised data. 
The performance of  the top fifteen indexes based on the financial list is 
summarized in panel A of table 2.16. (The individual indexes j,,  were con- 
structed as in table 2.14.) Not  surprisingly, the in-sample RMSEs of  these 
fifteen indexes are almost identical and slightly surpass that of the XLI. The 
out-of-sample RMSEs vary and are somewhat better than the XLI’s, reflecting 
improvements made by the additional included variables-in  particular, stock 
prices, the purchasing managers’ index, and help wanted advertising. How- 
ever, all but one of these top fifteen indexes still have out-of-sample RMSEs 
exceeding 6 percent, well above the RMSEs achieved by some of the individ- 
ual indicators in table 2.14. 
Indexes constructed using the fifteen non-interest  rate and non-exchange 
rate indicators are examined in panel B of table 2.16. Although the in-sample 
RMSEs are substantially worse than in panel A (3.1 percent rather than 2.6 
percent), the RMSEs in the 1990 episode are cut almost in half. All indexes 
have out-of-sample RMSEs near-in  one case, less than-their  in-sample 
RMSE. The variables that appear in most of  the indexes are housing starts, 
weekly  employee hours,  help  wanted  advertising,  stock prices,  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, consumer sentiment. The price of  oil appears in  only one of 
these top fifteen indexes, and, significantly, this index exhibits out-of-sample 
performance typical of the indexes that exclude oil prices. 
facturing and trade inventories (RTR82,  MPCONl, LUINC, IVMT82). lo 
10. The results in tables 2.14 and 2.15 suggest that real money growth is another plausible 
indicator to be included. However, we find persuasive Friedman and Kuttner’s (in press) evidence 
that the relation between real money growth and output has been unstable historically-particu- 
larly over the 1980s-and  therefore excluded monetary aggregates as candidate indicators from 
these lists. Table 2.16  Performance of Alternative Composite Indexes: Six-Month Ahead Forecast Horizon 
RMSE  Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
Included Leading  6211-  88110-  88:lO-  905-  62:l-  88~10-  88~10-  905- 
Rank  Indicators  88:9  90:8  90:4  90:8  88:9  90:8  90:4  90:8 
XLI 
XLI2 
2.76  3.42  1.39  7.62  2.20  2.15  1.08  7.24 
3.80  2.61  1.57  5.24  2.83  1.93  1.35  4.67 
A. List Including XLI, XL12, and Selected Alternative Indicators 
HSBP. CF'C-CM6F. GlO-GlF, 
LPHRM, PMNO, HHSNTN. PW561 
HSBP. CF'W3M6F.  LPHRM, LHEL. 
PMNO, HHSNTN, PW561 
HSBP. CP&GM6F,  LPHRM, 
FSPCOMF. PMNO, HHSNTN. 
PW561 
4  HSBP. CP&GM6F,  GIO-GIF, 
LPHRM. LHEL. PMNO, PW561 
5  HSBP. CF'W3M6F. GlO-GlF, 
LPHRM, FSPCOMF, PMNO. PW561 
6  HSBP, CmM6F.  GIMIF. 
LPHRM. LHEL, FSPCOMF, PMNO 
7  HSBP, FYGTIOFS. CF'W3M6F. 
LPHRM. PMNO. HHSNTN, PW56l 
8  HSBP, CF'C-CMLF, GlO-GIF, 

































































(continued) Table 2.16  (continued) 
RMSE Computed over:  MAE Computed over: 
Included Leading  62:l-  88110-  88110-  90:5-  62~1-  88110-  88x10-  90:5- 











HSBP, CF'&CiM6F,  LPHRM, 
IVPAC. PMNO, HHSNTN. PW561 
HSBP, MDU82S. CPWM6F. 
LPHRM, PMNO, HHSNTN, PW561 
HSBP, EXNWTZFS, CPWM6F. 
LPHRM. PMNO. HHSNTN. PW561 
HSBP, CMM6F.  LPHRM. 
IPXMCA, PMNO. HHSNTN, PW561 
HSBP, LHNAPSS. CPMM6F. 
LPHRM, PMNO. HHSNTN, PW561 
HSBP, CP&GM6F, GIMlF, 
LPHRM, FSPCOMF. PMNO, 
HHSNTN 
HSBP, CPWM6F.  LPHRM, LHEL, 
FSPCOMF, PMNO, HHSNTN 
2.60  2.93  1.50  6.22  2.06  1.91  1.02  6.18 
2.60  2.97  1.53  6.28  2.06  1.96  1.06  6.25 
2.60  2.98  1.52  6.34  2.06  1.96  1.05  6.30 
2.60  2.97  1.52  6.29  2.06  1.95  1.05  6.26 
2.60  2.91  1.52  6.29  2.06  1.95  1.05  6.26 
2.60  3.26  1.36  7.24  2.07  2.06  .99  7.18 
2.60  2.99  1.31  6.57  2.05  2.00  1.05  6.49 
B. List Excluding Exchange Rates and All Interest Rate Indicators 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, IVPAC. 
FSPCOMF, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, IVPAC, 
RTR82. PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP. LPHRM, LEHL, IVPAC, 
MPCON8, PMNO, HHSNTN 
3.14  2.43 
3.14  2.45 
3.15  2.17 
.75  4.41  2.38  1.98  1.50  4.27 
.72  4.52  2.40  1.99  1.49  4.37 












HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, IVPAC. 
IVMT82, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, FSPCOMF, 
MPCONS. PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, IVPAC. 
LUINC, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, MDUSZS, LPHRM, LHEL. 
IVPAC, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM. LHEL, IVPAC, 
PMNO, HHSNTN, PW561 
HSBP, LHNAPSS, LPHRM, LHEL, 
IVPAC. PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, IPXMCA, LHEL, 
IVPAC, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL. FSPCOMF, 
RTRSZ, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, LHEL, FSPCOMF, 
IVMTSZ, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM. LHEL, IVPAC, 
FSPCOMF, MPCONB, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM, IPXMCA. LHEL, 
FSPCOMF, PMNO, HHSNTN 
HSBP, LPHRM. LHEL, IVPAC. 

































































































Nore: The indexes were selected form all possible indexes of  the form (21) and (22) that include at most 7 indicators, selected 
from lists of  15 indicators. The lists are as follows: panel A:  HSBP, MDUS~S.  EXNWTZFS, LHNAPSS,  FYGTIOFS, CE-GM~F,  GIO-GIF, 
LPHRM.  IPXMCA, LHEL,  IVPAC, FSPCOMF. PMNO, HHSNTN,  PW561; panel B:  HSBP,  MDUSZS, LHNAPSS,  LPHRM, IPXMCA, LHEL,  IVPAC. 
1991:2. See the notes to table 2.12. 
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Fig. 2.6  Recession probabilities based on alternative nonfinancial indicators 
Note: The dates on the horizontal axes denote t,  the date through which the data are available 
for computing P,,,,,. The recession probabilities were computed using the model of  sec. 2. I, 
with the leading indicators: HSBP. LPHRM, LHEL, IVPAC, FSPCOMF, PMNO, HHSNTN. The series are 
based on data revised through 1991:2. The shaded areas represent NBER data recessions. 
As a final exercise, the XLI model of section 2.1 was reestimated, replacing 
the leading indicators in panel B of table 2.1 with the seven indicators in the 
top-ranking index from the nonfinancial list (the first row  in  panel B, table 
2.16). (In the notation of  sec. 2.1, 0 was reestimated, but p was not.) The 
resulting recession probabilities P,  +  k,,  are plotted for selected horizons in fig- 
ure 2.6. The results are striking: the six-month-ahead recession probabilities 
P,,,,,  computed with these indicators over July-October are, respectively, 84, 
89, 92, and 91 percent. Evidently, had the short list of  fifteen indicators ex- 
amined in panel B been used over the summer of  1990 to produce recession 
forecasts, they would have predicted a recession starting in the fall of  1990. 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that, had they been used during the 
previous historical recessions, this set of indicators would have done substan- 
tially worse than those in the XRI: the index would have provided scant ad- 
vance indication of recessions in 1969 and 1974 and only ambiguous signals 
in 1979 and 1981. 
The composite indexes in this section put nonzero weight on only a few of 
the indicators and no weight on most. A natural alternative would be to con- 
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in table 2.13. One approach, analogous to the method used by  the DOC to 
construct its index, would be to put equal weight on all the included indica- 
tors; another, advocated by  Sims (1989), would be to impose strong prior 
restrictions on the weights so that, even though many coefficients would be 
estimated, these coefficients effectively would be a function of a much smaller 
number of coefficients that could be estimated more precisely. 
Some initial calculations suggest that such broadly based indexes would 
also have performed poorly in the 1990 episode. For example, a six-month- 
ahead index of the form (21) and (22), constructed using the forty-one indi- 
vidual leading indicators in table 2.14. with equal weights on each indicator 
(ai  =  1/41), results in  an in-sample RMSE of  3.9 percent and  an out-of- 
sample RMSE of 7.4 percent; neither represents a noticeable improvement 
over a constant forecast. When the weights {ai}  are estimated by OLS so that 
only forty-one parameters are estimated (in addition to the estimated lag coef- 
ficients in [22]), the in-sample RMSE drops to a low 2.2 percent, but the out- 
of-sample RMSE remains very large, 7.0 percent. These broadly based indi- 
cators do not exploit correlations across the individual leading indicators, so 
there might be room for improvement relative to these two crude indexes. 
Still, the poor performance of the preponderance of individual indicators in 
this episode, documented in tables 2.14 and 2.15, suggests that other more 
sophisticated broadly based indexes would also have performed poorly in this 
episode. 
2.5  Discussion and Conclusions 
The foregoing analysis has focused on the empirical performance of  one 
particular forecasting tool-the  XLUXRI model-but  also has implications 
that apply more generally to forecasting exercises based on  a broad set of 
leading indicators. Focusing initially on the XRI and the XLI, we draw six 
conclusions. First, there is only weak evidence for nonlinearities in the data 
not captured in the linear model sketched in section 2.1. The main exception 
is the usefulness of the estimated duration of a downturn in predicting when 
that downturn will end. This duration dependence, however, appears to be 
restricted to downturns and is significant only at very short forecasting hori- 
zons. 
Second, forecasts through September 1990 based on the XLUXRI model 
performed quite well. For example, the absolute three-month-ahead forecast 
error in June 1990 was only 0.4 percent at an annual rate. However, the model 
failed to forecast the precipitous declines that started in October. 
Third, there is no compelling evidence that the recession definition or  the 
algorithm for computing recession probabilities was misspecified. Rather, the 
failure of the model in the fall of  1990 can be attributed to large forecast errors 
in the conditional means. 
Fourth, the forecast errors in the conditional means do not appear to be the 146  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
result of overparameterization or the imprecise estimation of too many param- 
eters, given the list of included indicators.  A key piece of evidence for this 
conclusion  is that simple composite  indexes with the same variables  as the 
XLI but fewer parameters and a different, simpler structure exhibit perform- 
ance comparable  to that of the XLI, both  in and out of  sample.  Moreover, 
these simple alternative indexes that use the same set of indicators make fore- 
cast errors as large as or larger than those made by the XLI model during the 
fall of 1990. 
Fifth, the short-horizon recession probabilities produced by the model per- 
formed  relatively  well  during  this  episode.  In  October,  the  first month  in 
which there were large declines in the coincident indicators, P,,,  was 28 per- 
cent; by November, it was 80 percent. Thus, the index can claim the modest 
success of “forecasting” that the economy was already in a recession, once the 
downturn had begun in earnest. 
Sixth, the key source of difficulty was with the choice of indicators included 
in the model.  The financial variables in the XRI and the XLI behaved quite 
differently over the summer of 1990 than they had during the preceding reces- 
sions in 1973, 1980, and 1981. Prior to those earlier recessions, the Treasury- 
bill yield curve was sharply inverted, while in June-September  1990 it sloped 
upward. The corporate paper-Treasury-bill  spread in June 1990 was one-third 
its average value in the month before the previous three recessions. Although 
these indicators  failed to predict the  1990 recession,  a few (but not many) 
alternative indicators would have provided  advanced warning had they been 
incorporated into the XRI. The strongest evidence of this is the performance 
of  the  alternative seven-indicator index, constructed  from the list of  fifteen 
indicators that excluded the poorly performing interest rate and exchange rate 
indicators and included selected indicators that,  as it turned out, performed 
well, such as consumer expectations.  Had this set of indicators been used as 
the basis of the XRI, the index would have registered much larger recession 
probabilities  and  would  have  reduced  the  out-of-sample  RMSE  by  almost 
half. 
These results  also suggest some more general conclusions  and  areas for 
future research. While the results of sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 indicate that the 
downturn could have been forecast-in  the sense that there were composite 
indexes that, had they been constructed, would have performed well during 
the summer and fall of 1990-the  decisions on which variables to include and 
which to omit were made with the benefit of hindsight. The challenging, un- 
solved-and  hardly new-problem  that this underscores is developing an ap- 
propriate  methodology  for the  identification  and  selection of  leading  indi- 
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Appendix 
Variable Dejinitions 
All data were obtained from Citibase, with the exception of  those denoted 
“(AC),” which were calculated by the authors. A single asterisk (*) indicates 
that log first-differences of the variable were used, a double asterisk (**) that 
first-differences of the variable were used. 
Coincident Indicators 
IP* 
Industrial production: total index (1977 = 100; seasonally adjusted). 
Personal income: total less transfer payments, 1982$ ($billion, seasonally 
adjusted at an annual rate). 
Manufacturing  and  trade  sales:  total,  1982$  ($million,  seasonally  ad- 
justed). 
Citibase series LPMHU  (employee-hours in nonagricultural establishments 
[billion hours, seasonally adjusted at an  annual rate]), adjusted for short 
sampling weeks  in  1970:9,  1974:4, 1979:4,  1981:9, and  1982:l. If  the 
sampling week was short in month I,  the adjusted series was computed as 
% (LPMHU,,  + LPMHU,-  ,). 





Housing authorized: index of new private housing units (1967 = 100; sea- 
sonally adjusted). 
Manufacturers’ unfilled orders: durable goods industries, total ($million, 
seasonally adjusted) (MDU),  deflated by  the producer price index: durable 
manufacturing  goods  (not  seasonally  adjusted)  (PWDMD):  log  first- 
difference, smoothed. PWDMD was seasonally adjusted prior to deflating by 
removing average monthly growth rates. 
EXNWT2 is the nominal weighted exchange rate between the United States 
and France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West  Germany, con- 
structed using shares of total real imports as weights. EXNWT2FS is the log 
first-difference, smoothed, led by one month. 
LHNAPS is persons at work: part time for economic reasons-slack  work, 
nonagricultural industries (thousands, seasonally adjusted). LHNAPSS is the 
log first-difference, smoothed. 
MDU82S (Ac) 
EXNWT2FS (AC) 
LHNAPSS (Ac) 148  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
FYGTlOFS (Ac) 
FYGTIO is  the  interest  rate:  U.S.  Treasury  constant  maturities,  10  year 
(% per annum, not  seasonally  adjusted). FYGTlOFS  is the  first-difference, 
smoothed, led by one month. 
FYCP - FYGM6,  led by one month, where FYCP is the interest rate: com- 
mercial paper, 6 month (% per annum, not seasonally adjusted), and FYGM6 
is the interest rate: U.S. Treasury bills, secondary market, 6 month (% per 
annum, not seasonally adjusted). 
FYGTIO -  FYGT1, led by one month, where FYGTIO is the interest rate: U.S. 
Treasury  constant maturities,  10  year  (% per  annum, not  seasonally  ad- 
justed), and FYGTl is the interest rate: U.S.  Treasury constant maturities,  1 
year (% per annum, not seasonally adjusted). 
CP6-GM6F  (AC) 
GIO-GlF  (AC) 
Leading Indicators in the XLI 2 
LPHRM 
Average weekly  hours of  production  workers:  manufacturing  (seasonally 
adjusted). 
IPXMCA** 
Capacity utilization rate: manufacturing total (% of capacity, seasonally ad- 
justed). 
Index of  help wanted advertising  in newspapers  (1967  = 100; seasonally 
adjusted). 






S&P'S common stock price index: composite (1941-43  = lo), led by one 
month. 
Money stock: M1 in 1982$ ($billion, seasonally adjusted). 
Money stock: M2 in 1982$ ($billion, seasonally adjusted). 
Monetary base, adjusted for reserve requirement changes (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis) ($billion, seasonally adjusted). 
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FCBCUCY (AC) 
Change in  business  and consumer credit outstanding  (%,  seasonally  ad- 
justed at an annual rate) (FCBCUC)  minus the annual percentage growth in 
total nominal person income (GMPY). 
Interest rate:  Federal  funds (effective) (% per annum, not  seasonally  ad- 
justed), led by one month. 
FYFFF 
BAA-G1OF  (AC) 
FYBAAC - FYGTlO,  led by  one month, where FYBAAC is the bond yield: 
Moody's  Baa Corporate  (% per  annum), and  FYGTIO is  the interest rate: 
U.S. Treasury constant  maturities,  10 year (% per annum, not seasonally 
adjusted). 
Inverted yield curve dummy, led by one month. Dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 when GIO-GI is negative. 
YLD-DUMF  (AC) 
Employment Variables 
LUINC" 
Average  weekly  initial  claims, state unemployment  insurance,  excluding 
Puerto Rico (thousands, seasonally adjusted). 
Unempoyment by duration: persons unemployed less than 5 weeks (thou- 
sands, seasonally adjusted). 
Employment: ratio; help wanted ads: no. unemployed current labor force. 
LHU5* 
LHELX 
Sales and Consumption Variables 
IPCD" 
Industrial production:  durable consumer goods (1977  =  100; seasonally 
adjusted). 
Personal consumption expenditures: durable goods,  1982$. 
Retail sales: total,  1982$ ($million, seasonally adjusted). 
GMCD82* 
RTR82" 
Inventories and Orders 
MPCON8" 
Contracts and orders for plant and equipment in 1982$ ($billion, seasonally 
adjusted). 
Manufacturing new orders: consumer goods and material,  1982$ ($billion, 
seasonally adjusted). 
Manufacturing new orders: durable goods industries,  1982$ ($billion, sea- 
sonally adjusted). 
MOCM82" 
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IVMT82* 
Manufacturing  and trade inventories: total, 1982$ ($billion, seasonally ad- 
justed). 
Log first-difference  of  IVM  1 : real manufacturing inventories,  materials and 
supplies: all manufacturing  industries (materials and supplies inventories), 
deflated by the total inventories price deflator, IVMTIIVMT~~,  where IVMT is 
total nominal manufacturing  inventories. Growth rate in  1982:  1 is average 
of growth rates for 1981:12 and 1982:2 to adjust for accounting change in 
1982: 1. 
Log first-difference of  IVM~:  real manufacturing and trade inventories: work 
in process, all manufacturing industries (seasonally adjusted), (work in pro- 
gress inventories), deflated  by  the  total  inventories  price  deflator,  IVMTI 
IVMT82,  where  IVMT  is total  nominal  manufacturing  inventories.  Growth 
rate in  1982:l is average of growth rates for 1981:12 and  1982:2 to adjust 
for accounting change in 1982:  1. 
Log  first-difference  of  IVM~:  real  manufacturing  inventories:  finished 
goods, all manufacturing  industries  (finished  goods inventories),  deflated 
by  the  total  inventories  price  deflator,  IVMT/IVMT~Z,  where  IVMT is total 
nominal  manufacturing  inventories.  Growth rate  in  1982: 1 is average of 







Log first-difference  of the ratio of  the volume of bank loans to the volume 
of commercial paper, where bank loans are commercial bank loans to the 
nonfarm corporate business sector and the nonfarm  corporate  sector, ex- 
cluding mortgages and bankers’  acceptances. The original  series is quar- 
terly and was distributed to a monthly basis as follows: the growth rate from 
QI to QII (say) was used  as the data for June, July, and August  (because 
growth from QII to QIII includes lending through September). Source: Fed- 
eral Reserve Board, quarterly flow-of-funds data bank (kindly provided by 
A. Kashyap, J. Stein, and D. Wilcox). 
Purchasing managers’ index (seasonally adjusted). 
National Association of Purchasing Managers new orders index (%). 
University of Michigan index of consumer expectations. 
HHSENT  interpolated  with  HHSNTR:  1953-1977:4,  HHSENT,  University  of 
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justed);  1978: 1-1990:  12, HHSNTR,  University  of  Michigan  index of  con- 
sumer sentiment (February 1966 = 100: not seasonally adjusted). 
Producer  price  index:  crude petroleum  (1982 =  100; not  seasonally ad- 
justed). 
PW~~IIPW.  where  PW  = producer  price  index: all  commodities  (1982  = 
100; not seasonally adjusted). 
U.S.  merchandise imports:  petroleum  and petroleum  products  ($million, 
seasonally adjusted). 
FTM~/PW,  where  PW  = producer  price  index: all commodities  (1982 = 







NBER experimental index of leading indicators. 
Expected length of current recession (construction is described in the text). 
Expected length of current expansion (construction is described in the text). 
(P,,,)  x  (MTREC)  + (1 -  P,,,)  X  (MTEXP)  (construction is described in the 
text). 
DLEAD* 
U.S. Department of  Commerce composite  index of  11 leading indicators 
(1982 = 100; seasonally adjusted). 
Dummy variable taking on  the value of  1 at time r if  3 consecutive down- 
turns of  DLEAD have occurred. That is, DL3D(t)  =  1 if  ADLEAD(r)  < 0, 
AD LEAD(^ -  1) <  0, and AD LEAD(^ -  2) <  0, and  DL~D  (t)  =  0  other- 
wise. 
Dummy variable taking on the value of  1 at time t if 3 consecutive upturns 
of  DLEAD  have  occurred.  That  is,  DL3U(t)  =  1  if  ADLEAD(t)  > 0, 
ADLEAD(f - 1) >  0, and ADLEAD(t -  2) > 0, and DL3U(t)  =  0  other- 
wise. 
Dummy variable taking on the value of  1 at time t if 3 consecutive down- 
turns of  IP have occurred. That is, IP3D(t) = 1 if AIP(~)  < 0, AIP(~  - 1) < 
0, and Aw(r -  2) < 0, and IP3D(t) = 0 otherwise. 
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of  IP have occurred. That is, IP~U(I)  =  1 if Aw(t) <  0, AiP(t - 1) < 0, and 
AiP(t -  2) < 0, and IP3D(t) = 0 otherwise. 
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COInInent  Kenneth F.  Wallis 
Notable among recent work on cyclical indicators is the attempt by James H. 
Stock and Mark W.  Watson  (henceforth  S-W)  to recast  the traditional  ap- 
proach in a suitable form for the application of the techniques of modern time- 
series econometrics. Two previous papers (Stock and Watson 1989, 1991) de- 
scribe new indexes of  coincident  and leading indicators,  which are based on 
the dynamic single-index model of Sargent and Sims (1977), and a new reces- 
sion index, which is an estimate of the probability that the economy will be in 
recession  in  six months’ time, where a recession  is defined  as a particular 
pattern of  movements in the unobserved  single index or “state of  the econ- 
omy.” The publication of probability forecasts in economics is itself a consid- 
erable innovation. In the present paper, S-W  provide a detailed account of the 
construction of  the recession index and of its forecasting performance both in 
and out of sample; in the light of  its forecast failure in late  1990, they then 
return to the question of  the selection of  variables used as indicators  in the 
model. 
The evaluation of economic forecasts has a large literature, to which impor- 
tant early contributions came from an NBER project directed by  Victor Zar- 
nowitz in the late  1960s. This literature scarcely considers probability fore- 
casts, however,  since these have scarcely featured in economics.  Rather, the 
literature on the theory and practice of  probability forecasting is largely to be 
found in the meteorological journals, stimulated by the inclusion of a state- 
ment of the probability of  precipitation in U.S. weather forecasts over a con- 
siderable period of years (for a review, see Dawid 1986). A simple summary 
indicator of forecast performance is a reliability diagram or calibration curve, 
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in which the observed relative frequency of the event is calculated over subsets 
of occasions for which the forecast probability was at, or close to, preassigned 
values and then  plotted  against those  forecast probability  values: in the ab- 
sence of  sampling fluctuations, a diagonal line indicates perfect reliability or 
that  the  forecaster  was  “well  calibrated”  (Dawid  1982).  Of  course,  large 
samples are always a help, and daily rainfall forecasts are thirty times more 
frequent than monthly economic forecasts; nevertheless, we can make a start 
by plotting R  against P  within the columns of  panel  B of  S-W’s  table 2.3. 
This dramatically  illustrates  the  lack  of  complete-sample  reliability  of  the 
recession probability  forecasts, which  were  in  general  too high.  While  the 
criterion of perfect reliability  or complete calibration is not by  itself a suffi- 
cient condition for forecasts to be good-it  would be achieved in the present 
case by  a forecaster  whose one-month-ahead  recession  probability  forecast 
was always equal to 0.146-it  has often been taken to be a minimum desirable 
property. 
Another useful diagrammatic presentation  of probability forecasts is found 
in an exception to the general comment above about the lack of an economics 
literature,  namely,  the contribution  to the  early NBER  project  by  Fels  and 
Hinshaw (1968). For each turning point during 1948-61,  they are concerned 
with how  well  it  was first forecast and  then, ex post, recognized,  so for a 
number of different forecasters they plot P,,,  for fixed T,  the turning-point date, 
against t, the date of  the forecast,  in S-W’s  notation.  (Mention of Fels and 
Hinshaw is not intended to detract from the originality of  S-W’s  probability 
forecasts: Fels and Hinshaw’s analysis was based on their own subjective as- 
sessment of  the odds on a turning point implicit in the forecasters’ language.) 
In the present case, this plot amounts to reading the entries in table 2.6 along 
a diagonal moving upward  to the right,  setting T  at October  1990 if  that is 
eventually declared to be the turning point. Corresponding plots for previous 
turning points can be constructed  from data shown in the various panels of 
figure 2.1: although these are within  sample, the resulting  comparison dra- 
matically  illustrates the relative forecast failure of the recession  index in the 
most recent episode. 
Attention then turns to the choice of indicator variables to include in the 
model and the appropriateness  of  the model itself. The first of  these has al- 
ready been the subject of comment by Sims (1989) and Zarnowitz and Braun 
(1989), who  are  now  to some extent entitled to say we told  you  so. Sims 
questioned the heavy dependence of the new leading index on variables, three 
out of seven, that are functions of interest rates, while, in comparing the S-W 
and  Department  of Commerce (DOC) indexes, Zarnowitz and Braun  ques- 
tioned  the  inclusion of the nominal exchange rate and the  exclusion of the 
DOC index’s vendor performance variable. This criticism is by and large val- 
idated by S-W’s  evidence from the recent past: whereas the financial variables 
did not perform well, forecasts of the recession could have been improved by 
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ment  variable  that  was added  to the DOC  set in  January  1989. Why,  then, 
were these variables not selected for inclusion in the original model? 
The dynamic single-index model is a linear time-invariant model, and the 
selection  and  weighting  of  leading  indicator  variables is likewise based  on 
linear regression methods. Whereas Sims ( 1989) expresses disappointment at 
the use of a model without time-varying coefficients, my reservation concerns 
its linearity. These are not unrelated, of course, since a linear approximation 
to a nonlinear  model  in general  has time-varying  or,  more precisely,  state- 
dependent coefficients. In a forecasting context, however, some model of the 
time  variation  is  necessary,  which  requires  either  a return  to the  nonlinear 
model or, if this is unknown, the use of one of the statistical models of  time- 
varying coefficients, which typically rest on underlying constant parameters. 
In the context of the statistical modeling of the business cycle, features such 
as its asymmetry are well established, as is the fact that these cannot be ade- 
quately  accommodated by  linear  constant-parameter  models.  See, for ex- 
ample, Hamilton (1989), Pfann (1991), and earlier references given by  these 
authors, whose own work illustrates the distinction drawn by S-W  (Stock and 
Watson  1989, 356-57)  between  the “intrinsic”  and the “extrinsic”  views of 
cycles. In the former view, expansions and recessions are regarded as periods 
of  distinctly  different economic behavior,  defined  by  intrinsic  shifts  in  the 
data-generating  process, whereas, in the  latter view,  expansions and reces- 
sions are extrinsic patterns that result from the adaptation of a stable structure 
to random shocks. Thus, Hamilton  (1989) uses a Markov switching regres- 
sion to characterize changes in the parameters of  a linear autoregressive pro- 
cess,  whereas  Pfann  (1991) uses  a  nonlinear  autoregression  with  constant 
coefficients  to capture asymmetries. Here, as  in other areas of  economics, 
competing views need to be tested against one another and, no doubt, against 
other models yet to be developed. Extension is also required from the univar- 
iate to the multivariate setting in which S-W  are located, and rightly so, since 
the business cycle is about comovements in a broad range of  macroeconomic 
aggregates. But the evidence from these different models suggests that S-W 
should  not  underestimate  the  evidence  of  nonlinearity  found  in  their  own 
rather limited testing and indeed supports their call for further research. If the 
regime-shift view is upheld, then, at a simple level, the selection of  indicators 
for predicting  recessions might  be based  on weighted  rather  than ordinary 
least squares. 
Judgment plays an essential part in the selection of indicators, the dating of 
turning points, and various other aspects of traditional business-cycle analy- 
sis, and its elimination is the ultimate target of the modem model-based meth- 
ods. Judgment, of  course, accommodates nonlinearity  of unspecified  form, 
but  it is not just seat of  the pants, Zarnowitz  and Braun  (1989) noting the 
reliance  of  the traditional  approach on business-cycle  theory  and  selection 
criteria that are formally stated, albeit informally weighted; formalization of 
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the other hand, Sims (1  989) notes that S-W  have only partially formalized the 
selection process and that therefore the forecast uncertainty that results from 
uncertainty  about  which  variables  belong  in  the  model  is  not  completely 
known: “The criteria for [respecifying or adjusting the model] should be more 
explicit, if  we are to  have  much  improvement  over the current judgmental 
DOC procedures” (p. 397). The seasonal adjustment problem provides an in- 
teresting parallel.  Here, too, the traditional  methods were developed in  the 
absence of  a formal probability  model  and formal  statistical criteria; subse- 
quently, model-based methods were developed as an alternative and as an aid 
to understanding  the behavior and characteristics of  the traditional methods. 
They have not replaced the traditional methods in the official statistical agen- 
cies, however, one objection being the need for skilled judgment in the model- 
based methods (specifically in the choice of the ARIMA representations used 
at various points). This might seem a somewhat contrary objection since more 
generally the traditionalists feel that the modem methods overlook much that 
is of value in their own use of judgment. Perhaps the same tension will persist 
in business-cycle  analysis, with the result that a probability model  that pro- 
vides a complete rationalization of the traditional methods cannot be attained. 
Many avenues remain to be explored, however, and, in the meantime, S-W 
deserve congratulations  for having clearly advanced the debate, in particular 
by establishing a more scientific foundation. 
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